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The Correct Theory on the Truth of Faith
By: Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
First of all, we have to take note that many subjects are discernible but not explainable; that is, we can understand it and be totally aware of it, but in explanation and elucidation, we cannot depict to others its nature and at most what we can do is to show its effects. We all know what fear is, but once we want to explain it, instead of pointing out its nature, we embark on mentioning its effects and signs. For example, we say, “Fear is a condition once it is experienced by a person, his hands and feet will shake, he will turn pale and his heart will beat faster.”
In the same vein, if we are asked, “What is love?” we cannot explain what love means; we can only mention its effects and signs. Concepts similar to these are not limited in number. Faith belongs to this sort of concepts; it is an inner state which is discernible through demonstrative knowledge, and in explaining it, we can only describe its effects and signs. Faith is an emotional and psychological state which requires that man should be bound to its requisites; that is, in action, he is supposed to be committed to fulfilling its requisites. There are so many things which are known to many people but they in practice are not willing to observe its requisites.
So many people know that smoking has many destructive effects which may bring about numerous problems, but they are not willing to put this knowledge into practice. They act as if they do not know. Here, there is knowledge and no faith. Why? It is because the decision is not accompanied by putting it into practice and fulfilling its requisites. If a person knows of a thing and then decides to be committed to this knowledge in practice, it means that he has faith in it. And if in spite of the knowledge he has, he makes no decision to act upon it accordingly or decides not to do it at all, he is then a denier [kafir] of it though he has knowledge of it.
Given this explanation, the meaning of Pharaoh’s denial [kufr] becomes clear; he knew that there is God; Musa is a prophet of God; and his miracles are divine signs, but he was not inclined to put this knowledge into practice; therefore, he was a kafir. The people of Pharaoh had the same case concerning knowledge: “They were convinced in their hearts” but “they impugned them.” They were not inclined to follow it in action.
Meanwhile, as to how man can, in spite of knowing a thing and having definite knowledge of it but being not inclined to follow it in practice is another story which is presently not connected to our discussion. If we want to give a brief to this question, we have to say that this matter is related to the enjoyments that man will experience in indulging in or abandoning it. In general, whims and caprice and emotional attachments hinder man from having faith. The story of the Prophet’s imprecation with the Christians of Najran which has been mentioned in the Qur’an is a good testimony to this fact.
The Christian priests and learned men of Najran (a city in the outskirts of Yemen) came to Medina and wanted to arrange an academic debate with the Prophet (S). Of course, they were prominent and learned men and they imagined that they could condemn the Prophet (S) in the academic dispute and defeat him. It was agreed upon that they would embrace Islam if they would be defeated in the debate. A large crowd gathered in the Mosque to witness the debate. The Prophet (S) engaged in a debate with them.
Finally, in this debate, the Christian scholars were condemned and defeated in the discussion. The Prophet (S) asked them to embrace Islam according to the promise they had given, but they refused to do so with the pretext that they were not yet convinced. A verse was revealed in which the Prophet (S) is asked to say to the effect: “Since you will not be convinced in a discussion, do a certain thing and be ready for an imprecation. The following day, the two parties were supposed to meet at a place outside Medina and curse each other so that God would send down His chastisement on the false group and annihilate them. The Qur’an thus says in this regard: Should anyone argue with you concerning him, after the knowledge that has come to you, say, ‘Come! Let us call our sons and your sons, our women and your women, our souls and your souls, then let us pray earnestly and call down Allah’s curse upon the liars’. (3:61)
The Prophet along with Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (who were then children), Lady Fatimah az-Zahra' and Imam ‘Ali (‘a) were present for the imprecation. Once the Christians of Najran cast their eyes upon these five holy personages, they were frightened and they said to themselves, “If he had only had an iota of doubt, he would not have brought with him the best of his nearest ones and in sum, he would have been present for the imprecation! We will not accept Islam anyway, but we are willing to pay the Jizyah tax.” Once the Holy Prophet (S) was asked about the reason behind this decision, he said, “They discerned and had ascertained that I am the Messenger of Allah and on the true side while they are on the false side, but because of their habit and interest in eating pork and drinking wine, which are both unlawful in Islam, we were not able to dispense with the enjoyment of eating pork and drinking wine, and thus, they did not yield to the truth.”
In spite of being certain about a thing, a person may not yield to it; rather, he may deny it because of whims and caprice, enjoyment, arrogance, etc. For example, if Pharaoh believed in God, his people would no longer acknowledge him as God and he would be forced to abandon all his power, wealth, outward splendor, elegance, and pomp, and would live like a common man.
Faith’s Relationship with Knowledge and Freewill
Thus, in faith, in addition to knowledge and awareness, there is another needed element; a mental and psychological element through which man should create in himself a state of submission, acceptance and obedience to the Truth and “to be bound by its requisites.” Faith means “knowledge in addition to the state of inner obedience in accepting the requisites of knowledge.” From here the issue of faith’s voluntary nature becomes clear, because to have or not to have this state of obedience is a voluntary affair. He who is addicted to smoking is still not willing to abandon this habit in spite of knowing its many destructive effects. He is not forced to smoke. In fact, like thousands of other people who decided to quit it and succeeded, he can also make a definite decision and quit smoking. This state of submission which is the resolution to be bound by the requisites of his knowledge is a totally voluntary affair.
As such, “to know” and “to be voluntary” have no contradiction. This is contrary to the claim that if a person acquires knowledge, he has no option but to accept and submit to it, and as such, faith cannot be reconciled with knowledge. Our reply is: knowledge is one thing, while the resolution to be bound by the requisites of the knowledge is another thing. As we have explained, the latter is an affair totally at the discretion of the person himself. Even knowledge and knowing themselves, from the perspective of their preliminaries, are voluntary. In order to pass the university entrance examination, a person studies and works hard, passes the exam and goes to the university. Is this going to the university voluntary or involuntary for him?
Obviously, it is voluntary. Thus, a person who has gone to the university and studied hard has become a teacher and expert because he himself wanted to do so and has indeed done it. If he had willed, he would not have studied and passed the examination, or after admission to the university, he might not have studied so to be expelled. It is true that if a teacher in a geometry class proves a theorem through a proof, the schoolchild will acquire knowledge and have no way for denial, but attending the class, sitting down there, and listening attentively to the teacher (which is required in acquiring knowledge) are voluntary affairs.
Even if we assume that acquisition of knowledge is not voluntary, faith is not mere knowledge and “obedience” is also a requisite; and obedience is completely a voluntary affair. To decide to be bound by the requisites of knowledge or not is at the discretion of man himself. So, it is not ironic to say that faith is a voluntary affair which is occasionally accompanied by knowledge whose acquisition is not voluntary. The secret behind this matter is that once there is a voluntary element in a set, this is enough for us to regard the set as voluntary.
Citing another example can help make the issue clear. Let us assume that I am now busy talking. Is speaking a voluntary or involuntary affair? Obvious, it is voluntary. But for me to talk and speak has hundreds of necessary prerequisites none of which is under my control. I should have lungs, voice, healthy vocal chords in the larynx, mouth and nose to emit air from my lungs, and many other prerequisites. Are they under my control? Is it under my will and control for me to have lungs, or not? Clearly, God has given me the lungs, but it might not be that I preferred to have lungs.
Is it my choice that there is air? God has created the air, and it is not that since I desired and preferred to have air, there is air. Now, the question is: Although none of these prerequisites is volitional and has formed out of our will, why do we still say that speaking is a voluntary action? The reply is that because a part of it is voluntary. For me to decide to use a certain word and voice to create certain words and expressions is under my control. So, the existence of a voluntary part in a set whose tens of parts are involuntary is enough to prove the voluntary nature of the set.
Faith is voluntary in this sense, although its requisite is knowledge which is sometimes acquired by man involuntarily. Knowledge may be acquired by me involuntarily but the decision to act upon the requisites of knowledge is under my control. This is enough to prove the voluntary nature of faith.
Now, you judge how wrong the one who introduces himself as a philosopher and says that even if it is voluntary, faith cannot be reconciled with freewill is. Is for me to merely know that smoking is harmful enough to make me avoid smoking? In addition, should we decide not to smoke? Since I have knowledge (of the harm of smoking), am I compelled not to smoke? Does being voluntary necessarily mean being associated with ignorance and unawareness?
What a senseless claim for us to say that the requisite of faith being voluntary is that there should be no knowledge as there are ignorance and doubt! Yes, this statement may be appropriate for the Church authorities who have been entangled with false and baseless doctrines. As we have pointed out, in order to escape the responsibility of the doctrines and teachings which are inconsistent with the intellect, they chose this way, i.e. to say that the domain of knowledge and intellect is different from that of religion, and these are religious teachings which have nothing to do with neither knowledge nor the intellect.
Yes, faith which Islam wants is not blind at all and it is not arisen from ignorance and lack of understanding; rather, we have to understand and be aware first, and then have faith. Blind and ignorant faith has no value. First, knowledge must be acquired and then one has to decide to be bound by it.
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