Chapter 6

Jihad And Leadership
The caller of Kufa called: "The prayer is a general one (which all should have attained) (al-salat jami `a). "The people gathered. Al-Hasan, peace be on him, went out. He went up on the pulpit. He praised Allah, lauded Him, and said: "Now then, indeed, Allah has enjoined jihad (fighting) on you, and has called it dislike. Then He said to the mujahidin (holy fighters): `Be patient. Indeed, Allah is with the patient.' People, you do not obtain what you like but through enduring what you dislike. I have heard that Mu'awiya has advanced against us. Therefore, may Allah have mercy on you, go out to your camp at al-Nukhayla [1] so that we may look and you look, we may see and you see.
The historians of the event said: "The people kept silent. They did not speak to him, nor did they answer him with a letter."
`Adi b. Hatam was the chief of (the tribe of) Tay. He was a notable leader for his glorious deeds. He was a companion of both the Prophet and 'Ali, the trustee of authority (wasi), may Allah bless them. When he saw that (attitude), he was full of anger. His voice boomed and shook the gathering people. So they turned to him to understand his words and to take care of his affair. Many people knew the history of b. Hatam al-Ta'i. They knew his righteousness, and his resistance for the truth. The leader (i.e., `Adi b. Hatam) used effective words and intense scolding. He condemned the silence of the people, and denounced their abominable weakness.
Then `Adi said: "I am `Adi b. Hatam. How ugly this attitude is! Why do you not answer your Imam, the son of the daughter of your Prophet? Where are the orators of the city? Where are their tongues that are like the penetrating swords during peace? Why do they trick like the fox during seriousness? Do you not fear Allah's disgust? Do you not feel shame for the defect and the disgrace of it (the attitude)?"
Then `Adi b. Hatam turned his face to al-Hasan and said: "May Allah achieve right guidance through you, guard you against misfortunes, and grant you success to do laudable acts. We have heard your words. We have obeyed your order. We have listened to you. We have obeyed you in what you have said and seen. Now, I am heading for our camp."
Then he said: "So whoever wants to come, let him come." Then he went out of the mosque. His riding animal was at the door (of the mosque). So he mounted it and headed for al-Nukhayla. He ordered his servant to follow him to supply him with his necessities. For this reason he was the first to go to the camp, [2] to set a good example to the other obedient mujahids (fighters). In (the tribe of Tay), there were a thousand fighters who obeyed `Adi in everything. [3]
After `Adi b. Hatam, other orators became active. They addressed al-Hasan in the same manner `Adi used. So al-Hasan, peace be on him, said to them: "May Allah have mercy on you. I still know your sincere intentions, your faithfulness, and your love. So may Allah reward you with good."
Al-Hasan, appointed his cousin, al-Mughira b. Noufal b. al-Harith b. `Abd al-Muttalib, as his successor over Kufa and ordered him to urge the people to join him at al-Nukhayla.
Al-Hasan went out with those who were with him. His going out was the first day of the declaration of jihad. In the meantime it was the strongest proof al-Hasan used to urge the people to take part in jihad.
The battalions of al-Nukhayla included the best companions from the followers (Shi'a) of al-Hasan and from the companions of his father, and the like.
Al-Mughira b. Noufal became active in urging the people to take part in jihad. The people held active festivals during the pledge of allegiance to the new Successor. It was expected for the new Succession to urge the people in Kufa to answer the summons of the Imam (i.e., al-Hasan) with enthusiasm.
However, nothing of that occurred. Noteworthy, there were ready companies. They had forty thousand fighters. The Commander of the faithful (i.e., Imam 'Ali) formed them to resist the attacks of the Syrians before his death. However, these ready companies divided and most of them mutinied against al-Hasan. Also most of the armed men in Kufa followed them in disobeying al-Hasan's orders.
Some hesitating Kufan chiefs became very active during the critical moment when the attitude became serious.
The historians have mentioned the following words on the authority of al-Harith al-Hamadani, who said: "Those who wanted to go out rode with him (i.e., al-Hasan). Many people refused to go with him. They did not fulfill what they had said and promised. They deceived him as they had deceived the Commander of the faithful before him. Al-Hasan camped at al-Nukhayla for ten days. No one joined him except four thousand fighters. So he came back to Kufa to urge people. There he delivered a sermon in which he said: "You have deceived me as you had deceived those who were before me." [4]
I (the author) say: We do not know exactly the number of those who joined al-Hasan. However, we know that he "left Kufa with a great army" as b. Abu al-Hadid said in his book `Sharh Nahj al-Balagha.'
In the chapter entitled, `the Number of the Army', we will discuss the ideas of the historians to choose the accurate number of the soldiers of al-Hasan, peace be on him.
Al-Hasan left al-Nukhayla and reached Dir `Abd al-Rahman. He stayed there for three days. At that place other mujahidin (fighters) joined him, but we do not know their number.
Dir of `Abd al-Rahman was situated between the two camps of Imam al-Hasan in al-Mada'in [5] and Maskan.[6]
As for al-Mada'in, it was at the bridgehead towards Persia and the neighboring area. Because of its geographical situation, al-Mada'in was the only area that protected the three lines that connected Kufa, Basrah, and Persia with each other. Because of its military importance, it drove back the events which the conditions of war caused. Persia was the place from which the revolts against the State started. Over Persia was Ziyad b. `Ubayd who was appointed by the Imam, and who went on his previous nature that changed every thing in him.
As for Maskan, it was the sensitive point in the history of the jihad of al-Hasan, peace be on him. That is because it was the field which al-Hasan was supposed to meet the enemy face to face. At that time it was on the far northern borders of Hashimite Iraq, or the areas dominated by the Kufan authority from this direction. At Maskan, there were agricultural lands, inhabited lands, and many famous villages such as Awana, `Ukbara, and al-`Alth that was the last village on the northern borders of Maskan [7]. Facing al-`Alth was a village called al-Jinubiya towards which Mu'awiya and his army advanced when they left the bridge of Manbij where the two armies met.
It is known today that the situation of Maskan is at these wide plains that are situated between the village of Sumayka and the village of Balad, with the exception of Samarra.'
Maskan had nature rich in resources, near rivers, and wide plains. Because of these natural features, Maskan was the best place for war. It was, for the first time in its history, the battlefield towards which al-Hasan and Mu'awiya advanced. Then many battles between Iraq and Sham (Syria) occurred there.
Al-Hasan, peace be on him, thought that it was better for him to use al-Mada'in, because of its military importance, as a headquarters for his high command to receive military supplies from the three neighboring cities and to be at the back of his field where he met Mu'awiya and the Syrians, namely at Maskan. There were no more than fifteen leagues between the two Hashimite camps, namely alMada'in and Maskan.
That was the excellent plan of which there was no alternative for that situation of war. In this way, namely through drawing his war plans, al-Hasan has shown us that he was the inspired leader who had command of war tactics as the people of his time called. Moreover, al-Hasan used gradual steps to resist his enemy. Namely, he tested the time, chose the situations, and led the armies. All these steps have indicated that he had outstanding military talents that were equal to the talents he had in policy, loyalty, and sacrifice.
Al-Hasan, peace be on him, looked left and right.
Then he considered carefully the prominent figures who were with him. They were from the leaders of his followers (Shi'a) and of his family. He wanted to choose a leader from them for his advance guards whom he determined to send to Maskan. Among the gentle ones of the tribe and the loyal Ansar (supporters), he found no one more eager and sincerer for the attitude of his cousin `Ubayd Allah [8] b. `Abbas b. `Abd al-Muttalib, Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbada al-Ansari, and Said b. Qays al-Hamadani, the head of the Yemenis in Kufa. So al-Hasan confined successively the leadership to these three leaders.
`Ubayd Allah b. `Abbas was among those who were eager for war, and was indifferent to life. Religious zeal moved him, and the tribal enthusiasm stirred him up. So he was melted in his fanaticism for the Hashimite throne as the melted steel. He was among the leaders of the Hashimites. As they say :"The bereaved woman of a child is unlike the hired one." As for his outstanding backgrounds, he was the Emir of the hajj in the year 36 A.H. (according to the narration in the book al-Isaba') or in the year 39 A.H. (according to the report of al-Tabari) or he was the Emir of the hajj in both years. He was the ruler of Bahrain and the Yemen [9] and their subsequent parts during the lifetime of the Commander of the faithful (i.e., Imam 'Ali). The pilgrims in Mecca bore witness that he was generous. Then he was the first to pledge allegiance to al-Hasan when the people pledged allegiance to him.
According to these excellent backgrounds, Imam al-Hasan, peace be on him, had great confidence in `Ubayd Allah. [10] Then al-Hasan summoned him and gave him commandments which have not fully been reported to us. Rather some books have briefly mentioned them.
In these commandments, al-Hasan, peace be on him, said :"Cousin, I am going to send with you twelve thousand from the horsemen of the Arabs and the readers of the Qur'an in the city. The man from them is more than a battalion. So lead them and treat them kindly.
That is because they are the rest of the reliable companions of the Commander of the faithful. Lead them to the Euphrates. Then go on (your advancing) till you make them meet Mu'awiya face to face. If you find him (i.e., Mu'awiya), then withhold him till I come to you, for I am about to follow you. Let your news come to me every day. Ask the advice of these two (persons) (i.e., Qays b. Sa'd, and Said b. Qays). If you meet Mu'awiya, then do not start fighting against him till he starts fighting against you. If he does, then fight him. If you were struck (i.e., killed or wounded), then Qays b. Sa'd would be (the leader) over the people. If he were struck, then Said b. Qays would be (the leader) over the people.
As you see that Imam al-Hasan peace be on him, did not mean `Ubayd Allah through his commandments. Rather he meant his Companions. So he (al-Hasan) praised them, lauded their bravery, and added them to his father, the Commander of the faithful, peace be on him. With all this praise and laud, al-Hasan wanted to raise the morale, to stir up their enthusiasm, and to move their feelings. Then al-Hasan ordered `Ubayd Allah to treat them kindly. Al-Hasan gave these commandments to `Ubayd Allah to create exchangeable confidence between the commander and the army. This confidence, in the war that suffered from the paucity of the modern military regulations, was the worthiest of importance of all the elements hoped for the black (bad) days. They (the commandments) are in four joined sentences. They underline each other. Then they have only one meaning. I (the author) wonder: Is it possible for us to make use of this intentional repetition of these sentences? They, through their emphasizing, tried to uproot a certain manner in `Ubayd Allah (the new commander). That is because there were great figures with him in his army. They had glorious backgrounds and reputation. Thus they were not unable to bear his proud manner, nor were they able to bear his rudeness. For he would enjoin and prevent them. In other words they were unable to bear these qualities in that Hashimite young man who was not the best of them in merit, jihad, piety, and age. [11]
After that are these words of al-Hasan: "Ask the advice of these two persons." These words are another evidence for that al-Hasan intended to reform the rude behavior of `Ubayd Allah. The Imam knew that his cousin had such a kind of behavior that would hinder his victory at the battle.
I (the author) say: That rude manner, if the doubt is true, would not prevent `Ubayd Allah from being worthy of the leadership. In other words many other conditions forced him to use that rude manners, for there is a close relation between rudeness and military life in the past and present times.
In this connection, we may raise a question: Why did al-Hasan, peace be on him, appoint `Ubayd Allah over the vanguard of his army? Didn't his army have great figures such as Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbad al-Ansari? Wasn't the latter known for his military merit, his loyalty to the family of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and his family, and his honesty?
We may answer these questions as follows:
1. When al-Hasan appointed `Ubayd Allah over the vanguard, he ordered him to ask the advice of both Qays b. Sa'd and Said b. Qays. That is what his clear commandments indicate. Through this measure, al-Hasan was able to avoid preferring `Ubayd Allah to the others. For he would be criticized for this preference. In the meantime this preference would affect that attitude. In this way the leadership became a consultation among the three persons who were the most appropriate ones of al-Hasan's men. Among these prominent figures, who were known for their leadership at the battle fields, loyalty, jihad, and back grounds, were Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, Hujr b. `Adi al-Kindi, `Adi b. Hatam al-Ta'i, and the like. We have already mentioned them.
Generally speaking, al-Hasan gave priority to `Ubayd Allah, who was al-Hasan's and the Prophet's cousin, may Allah bless him and his family, over the two other leaders. He appointed him as a leader only in name. He ordered him to ask the advice of Qays and his companion, as we have mentioned above. These steps put an end to any disagreement on the leadership or any competition for it.
2. Among the excellent precautionary measures for the general situations at that time was that no one would be a leader with al-Hasan but a Hashimite one.
To explain that, we may say that the intense weakness that accompanied the matter of al-Hasan in Kufa was still very ominous in his consideration. So al-Hasan had to take possible measures to avoid in his present and future times, the censure of the people, their accusing him of an error, and their criticism. It is easy for people to accuse someone of an error or to criticize him when they find weakness, failure, and deprivation in him. If the matter of al-Hasan in Maskan had failed, the people would have blamed him for that failure. They would say that if the leader had been from the family of al-Hasan, he would have been the most appropriate person for enduring the great adversities, and the matter would have not come to this result.
So al-Hasan was right when he got ready for the disasters of that time through appointing a Hashimite leader. This measure was very important.
3. `Ubayd Allah was more angry with Mu'awiya than any other man. He was angrier with him than Qays and the son of Qays. That is because `Ubayd Allah's two sons were killed when Bisr b. Artat attacked the Yemen. (This event is among the famous events in history.)
Thus it was very appropriate for al-Hasan to choose such a leader who was full of anger, and was eager to fight against the killer of his two sons.
The majority of the army of the vanguard headed by `Ubayd Allah was from the army which the Commander of the faithful prepared in Kufa to fight against the Syrians. Its worth mentioning that, Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbada was the commander of this army during the lifetime of the Commander of the faithful (i.e., Imam 'Ali), peace be on him. [12]
These backgrounds were of great importance in strengthening the links between the commander and his soldiers. It was easy for the commander who had great influence on his soldiers to incline, whenever he wanted, to free conduct. This kind of freedom would indicate that there was no positive relation between the commander and the Supreme Authority. So al-Hasan had to be careful of such a position, for it was the most import thing during that attitude.
Although we respect our master Qays very much, we do not deny his personal abilities that would make him incline to such a kind of free conduct.
We do not forget that Qays, on the day when he headed this army, stood among his soldiers and ordered them to choose either following the Imam's Peace Treaty or going on fighting against Mu'awiya without an Imam.
Accordingly, Imam al-Hasan carried out the best two ideas. In other words, he appointed a person as a commander for his army. In the meantime he made `Ubayd Allah b. `Abbas a military adviser to make use of his abilities and cleverness.
I (the author) say: Appointing Qays as a successor after `Ubayd Allah did not harm this policy (i.e., al-Hasan's policy). That is because Qays would, after the killing of his predecessor in the battlefields of Maskan according to the items of the convention, follow the plan, which his predecessor had followed. For the conditions of the battle between the two parties (i.e., al-Hasan and Mu'awiya) did not permit him to change the plan. Moreover, he (Qays) would be under the direct leadership of the Imam (who was) the high leader. From what we have already mentioned, we have known that the Imam promised the vanguard of his army that he was about to follow them.
After this (explanation), there was no danger in appointing Qays as a successor after `Ubayd Allah as long as the former was ordered to follow a certain plan, and was under the direct supervision of the Imam.
[1] Little date palm, a place near Kufa, towards Sham (Syria). I (the author) say: Today, there is, towards Karbala', a building called Khan al-Nukhayla. There are twelve miles between it and Kufa.
[2] Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 14.
[3] Al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh, vol. 2, p. 171.
[4] Al-Rawandi, al-Kharaij wa al-Jaraih, p. 228, (Iran).
[5] It was the Sassanid capital. It lasted for one thousand years. It was the inheritor of Babil (Babylon) in greatness. Today, none of its ruins has remained but Taq Kasra, and the Shrine of the great Companion (Salman al Farisi), may Allah have mercy on him. There were seven facing cities, namely they faced each other on the banks of Tigris. The Muslims conquered it in the year 15 A.H. At that time it was the capital of all the Persian East. So in the Western side were Saluqiya, Darzjan, Bahrsir, and Jindisabur (Kauka) in the district of Mazlam Sabat which was related to Nahr al-Malik (the River of the king). And in the Eastern side were Asfanbar, Romya, and Tishfon which had Taq Kasra.
More than one hundred years had passed before the extinction of al Mada'in because of the foundation of Baghdad in the year 150 A.H. During that period of time, al-Mada'in supplied Kufa with industries, resources, and crops. That was through sending Persian friends to it, who became Muslims.
Al-Mada'in followed the example of the family of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and his family, from the day when Salman became a governor over it. Also in the seventh century A.H., al Mada'in was a village which no one inhabited but the eager Shi'a.
Al-Mas'udi mentioned al-Mada'in when he mentioned Iraq. He said: "And the cities of Iraq were al Mada'in and the surrounding cities. The people of al-Mada'in had the most moderate colors, the purest perfumes, the best tempers, and the most obedient natures. In them were inclusive virtues, and peerless sound deeds."
[6] The name of al-Tasuj from which Awana was. It was situated on the bank of the river Dujayl. There were many gardens of date- palms and trees in it. Abu al-Faraj al-Sawadi (from the poets of the sixth century A.H.) meant it when he said:
And they regarded it as virgin grew in Awana
Hidden from her fiancees with the vessels.
There were ten leagues between Maskan and Baghdad. At Maskan, a battle took place between `Abd al-Malik b. Marwan and Mas'ab b. al-Zubayr in the year 72 A.H. Mas'ab and Ibrahim b. Malik al Ashtar were killed at that battle. They were buried where they were killed. Their graves are still visible. There is a humble dome over the two graves. The Arabs of Sumayka call this dome the Grave of Shaykh Ibrahim (Qabr Shaykh lbrahim). There are about sixty kilometers between this dome and Baghdad, and ten kilometers between it and Tigris. So Maskan was the area that surrounded this grave, including the river Dujayl. Also Awana was there.
[7] In al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya, al-Mawardi has mentioned the following on the authority of al-Hamawi, who said: "Al-`Alth is the first part of Iraq from this direction." I (the author) say: Al-`Alth is situated between `Ukbara and Samarra'. `Ukbara is among the villages of Dujayl, near Awanan.
[8] Al-Mufid, al-Irshad, p. 170. Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al Balagha, vol. 4, p. 14. Al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh, vol. 2, p. 191.
Another historian has mentioned that it was his brother `Abd Allah b. 'Abbas. That is incorrect, for `Abd Allah was not in Kufa during the days of the Succession of al-Hasan. Rather, he was in Mecca, and wrote to al-Hasan a letter in which he hinted at war. You find details about him in `Sharh Nahj al-Balagha', vol. 4, pp. 8-9. If `Abd Allah was in Kufa at that time, his name would not be hidden during those events. In his book `al-Ta'rikh', vol. 6, p. 81, al-Tabari said: "In the opinion of all historians, `Abd Allah b. 'Abbas went out of Basrah and reached Mecca. Some historians have denied that and claimed that the Commander of the faithful, peace be on him, appointed him a governor over Basrah. He governed it till he (the Commander of the faithful) was killed. (He was still a governor over Basrah) after the killing of 'Ali till al-Hasan made peace (with Mu'awiya). Then he left (Basrah) at that time for Mecca." I (i.e., the author) say: `Abd Allah b. 'Abbas was not in Basrah. If he had been there, the army would not have delayed. For al-Hasan was in a pressing need of it in al-Mada'in. Ibn al-Athir (vol. 3, p. 166) has underlined that `Abd Allah b. `Abbas left 'Ali during his lifetime.
We think that it is the similarity between the two brothers in father and name has made such an error in attributing the leadership to `Abd Allah. Another historian made a mistake so that he has attributed the leadership of the vanguard to Qays b. Sa'd who was the leader of the fighters who were in front of the vanguard as Ibn al-Athir has mentioned. That maybe the reason for this imagination. Then think.
[9] Some historians tried to doubt the historical backgrounds of `Ubayd Allah through the event that forced him to go out of the Yemen. It is an act of truthfulness to admit that the garrison of the Yemen was too weak to resist the attack of Bisr b. Artat at that time. Moreover, some of the Yemenis deserted the Hashimite authority. They wrote letters to Mu'awiya. They dismissed their Emir Said b. Nimran from the army. And they disobeyed their ruler `Ubayd Allah. All these factors and others indicate that `Ubayd Allah was innocent of the doubts. If `Ubayd Allah had tried to resist Bisr, the latter would have been able to defeat him with the help of the `Uthmanis in the Yemen. `Ubayd Allah did not do more than what his peers did in Mecca and Medina when they escaped from Bisr. The governor of Mu'awiya over the three capitals attacked the people where in. So he killed about thirty thousand innocent people.
We have known that `Ubayd Allah intended to go to Kufa when he left the Yemen. And if he had been suspicious, he would have not headed for Kufa. Besides we have known that Said b. Nimran apologized to the Commander of the faithful, peace be on him, when he said to the latter: "I summoned the people (i.e., the people of the Yemen) to fighting. A group of them answered me. So I fought weakly. Then the people left me, and I went away. I (the author) say: Will the experience of b. Nimran not correct the apology of `Ubayd Allah b. `Abbas? That is because the backgrounds of this man had no defect. Therefore, no wonder when al-Hasan was satisfied with him because of his reliable backgrounds.
[10] Ibn Abu al-Hadid, vol. 4, p. 14. Al-Mufid, al-Irshad, pp. 168-169. Al Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh, vol. 2, p. 191.
Only al-Ya'qubi did not mention the third leader from the leaders of the vanguard, then he said: "Al-Hasan ordered `Ubayd Allah to obey the order and idea of Qays b. Sa'd. So `Ubayd Allah advanced towards the Island (i.e., Mesopotamia). When Mu'awiya heard of the killing of 'Ali, peace be on him, he headed for Mousil eighteen days after the killing of 'Ali. I (the author) say: Mousil was among the villages of Maskan. Our master Muhammad b. Imam 'Ali al-Midi was buried near Mousil as al-Hamawi has mentioned in his book `al-Mujam'. It is other than the present city of Mousil (in Iraq).
There is no difference between what al-Ya'qubi and what the others reported about limiting the situation where the army of Mu'awiya stopped during his war against al-Hasan. That is because Mousil, al Haywada, al-Jinubiya were all among the villages of Maskan at that time. Maybe, the army occupied all these villages, so their names have been mentioned in various reports. Also some reports have been confined to some names as you see. As for us, we have only chosen al-Jinubiya depending on the letter Qays b. Sa'd wrote to al-Hasan as we will mention in the following chapters.
[11] `Ubayd Allah b. `Abbas was 39 years old on the day when he led this army.
[12] Ibn Kathir, Ta'rikh, vol. 8, p. 14.

Chapter 7

The Number Of The Army
The number of the army, that was in Kufa in the middle years of the first century, A.H. was forty thousand fighters. Every year ten thousand fighters of it made a campaign (against the enemies of Islam). (This is what the reliable books have mentioned).
We have known that the Commander of the faithful (Imam 'Ali), peace be on him, prepared forty thousand or fifty thousand fighters according to two different reports- to attack the Syrians. However, he had died before he made an attack with them. We think that al-Hasan's army was a group of the army which the Commander of the faithful prepared to fight against Mu'awiya.
Then we know nothing about the attitude of these armies towards al-Hasan b. 'Ali, peace be on them, when he summoned them to jihad (armed struggle).
Besides we have known, from more than one reference book, that the vanguard which al-Hasan sent to meet Mu'awiya at Maskan was estimated at twelve thousand fighters. The acceptable idea is that this vanguard was from the groups of the army which the Commander of the faithful formed before he died. So some of these groups supported al-Hasan while the rest refused that.
Then, from another reference, we have known that the. Kufans became excited on the day of al-Hasan, so they called up other four thousand fighters. [1]
Thus these are sixteen thousand fighters whom the unquestionable text have shown.
There also are other figures concerning the number of the army.
The historians have mentioned them, and the important declarations have included them. However, their correctness is liable to test and discussion.
The following are some texts about these different figures. First we will mention these figures as they are. Then we will check them properly.
1. In his book (Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 10, p. 110), he (i.e., Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi) said: "Then he (i.e., al-Hasan) dispatched to him (i.e., Mu'awiya) a leader with four thousand (fighters). He (the leader) was from Kinda. He (al-Hasan) ordered him (the leader) to camp in Anbar [2] and not to do anything till his (al-Hasan's) order came to him. When he (the leader) headed for Anbar and stopped there, Mu'awiya knew of that. Thus he sent messengers to him, and wrote to him: `
Indeed, if you came to me, I would appoint you as a ruler over some districts of Sham (Syria) and of the Island (al-jazirah), and the like.' He (Mu'awiya) sent him (the leader) five hundred thousand dirhams. So al-Kindi took the money. He deserted al-Hasan. He went to Mu'awiya with two hundred men from his notables and the member of his family. Al-Hasan heard of that. So he rose and delivered a sermon: `Al-Kindi went to Mu'awiya. He deserted me and you. I told you a time after a time (that) you have no faithfulness. You are the slaves of this world. I am going to send another man to replace him. I know that he (the man) will do towards you and me as your friend (i.e., al-Kindi) did.
He will never fear Allah concerning me and you.' So he (al-Hasan) sent him (Mu'awiya) a man from (the tribe of) Murad with four thousand (fighters). He (al-Hasan) came toward him (the man) before the very eyes of the people, confirmed him, and told him that he (the man) would desert as al-Kindi did. So he (the man) took a solemn oath before him (al-Hasan) that he (the man) would not do that. So al-Hasan said: `He will desert.' When he (the man) headed for AnbaI, Mu'awiya sent him messengers. He wrote to him as he (Mu'awiya) wrote to his (the man's) companion. He sent him five thousand (maybe he, the reporter, meant five hundred thousand) dirhams. He made him desire for any district he liked from the districts of Sham and of the Island. So he (the man) deserted al-Hasan, went to Mu'awiya, and did not keep his word."
After this text, al-Majlisi mentioned that al-Hasan took al-Nukhayla as a camp for him, and that al-Hasan went there.
2. In his book (Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 14), b. Abu al-Hadid said: "The people went out. They became active for going out. Then al-Hasan went out to the camp. He had appointed al-Mughira b. Noufal b. al-Harth b. `Abd al-Muttalib as a successor over Kufa. He ordered him to urge and dispatch the people to him. So he (i.e., al-Mughira) began urging and dispatching them to the extent that the camp was full (of people). Then al-Hasan went with a great army and good equipment till he stopped at Dir `Abd al-Rahman. He stayed there for three (days) till the people gathered. Then he summoned `Ubayd Allah b. al-'Abbas b. `Abd al-Muttalib, and said to him: `Cousin, I am going to send with you twelve thousand (men) from the horsemen of the Arabs and (the Qur'an readers) of the city.'"
3. Al-Tabari (vol. 6, p. 94.) reported on the authority of al-Zuhri, who said: "When Mu'awiya got rid of `Ubayd Allah b. 'Abbas and al Hasan, peace be on him, he came to plot against a man who was the most important of the people in plotting against him (Mu'awiya). There were forty thousand (fighters) with him. Mu'awiya, `Amru, and the Syrians met them."
4. In his book (Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 6), b. Abu al Hadid has mentioned the following on the authority of al-Mada'ini [3] on the authority of al-Musayyab b. Nujayya, who said to al-Hasan when he blamed him for his Peace Treaty with Mu'awiya `My astonishment at you does not end. You have made peace with Mu'awiya, (while) you have forty thousand (fighters). Or he (al Musayyab) said: `You have pledged allegiance to (Mu'awiya)', due to different reporters."
5. In his book (al-Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh, vol. 3, p. 61), Ibn al-Athir said: "Forty thousand fighters pledged allegiance to the Commander of the faithful ('Ali). They were ready to die for him when he told them about something concerning Sham (Syria) and they appeared. While he was getting ready to advance towards (Syria), he was killed. If Allah wills a thing, no one is able to repulse it (the thing). When he was killed, the people pledged allegiance to his son, al-Hasan. He (al Hasan) heard of the advance of Mu'awiya and the Syrians towards him. So he (al-Hasan) and the army that had pledged allegiance to 'Ali got ready and left Kufa to meet Mu'awiya, who had stopped at Maskan. So al-Hasan arrived in al-Mada'in. There he appointed Qays b. `Abbada al-Ansari over his vanguard with twelve thousand (fighters). It was said that al-Hasan appointed `Abd Allah [4] b. `Abbas over his (al-Hasan's) vanguard. So he (al-Hasan) appointed `Abd Allah b. `Abbas over his vanguard in the advance guards of Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbada."
I (the author) say: Ibn Kathir followed such a tradition. Apparently he has taken it letter by letter from the book `al-Kamil.'
6. Al-Mada'ini [5] has reported the words of al-Hasan, peace be on him, in response to the man who said to him: "Were you right in what you have done?" So al-Hasan said: "Yes, but I am afraid that seventy thousand or eight thousand (fighters) will come on the Day of Resurrection. Their jugular veins will bleed. So they will ask Allah why their blood had been shed."
7. In his book (al-Imama wa al-Siyasa, p. 151), b. Qutayba al-Dinawari has reported: "They mentioned that the people pledged allegiance to Mu'awiya. Then he (Mu'awiya) came back to Sham (Syria). Afterwards Sulayman b. Sirt al-Khaza'i, who was absent from Kufa and was the master and chief of the Iraqis, came to al Hasan and said to him: `You who have humiliated the believers, al salamu `alayka' ! Al-Hasan said: `wa `alayka al-salam, sit down, may Allah have mercy on your father.' He (b. Qutayba) said: Sulayman sat down and said: `Now then, our astonishment at you does not end because of your pledge of allegiance to Mu'awiya. You have one hundred Iraqi fighters who receive salaries. You have a similar number to them from their sons and friends. Moreover, you have followers (Shi'a) in Basrah and Hijaz."
I (the author) say: In his book (Tanzih al-Anbiya') al-Murtada, in his book (al-Manaqib) Ibn Shahrashub, and in his book (al-Bihar) al Majlisi have reported the complete text of what happened between Sulayman b. Sirt and his companions and al-Hasan, peace be on him. No one of them (the authors) have narrated on the authority of Sulayman and his companions that the number of the army was more than forty thousand (fighters).
So only b. Qutayba has reported on the authority of Sulayman that the number of the army was one hundred (fighters). Also only he used the word `pledge of allegiance' (al-bay'a) instead of the word `Peace' (Sulh).
8. Ziyad b. Abih, who was the governor of al-Hasan over Persia, said the following in response to Mu'awiya's threat: "Indeed, the son of she who ate the livers (i.e., Hind), of the shelter of hypocrisy, and of the rest of the allies (ahzab) has written to me to threaten me. Between me and him are the two grandsons of the Apostle of Allah. They have ninety thousand (fighters) {according to a report seventy thousand (fighters)}, who have put the hilts of their swords under their chins. No one of them turns till he dies. Indeed, by Allah, if he (i.e., Mu'awiya) came to me, he would find me stronger (than him) in hitting with the sword." [6]

Discussion
In this manner, these texts with various forms have suggested different figures about the number of the army. The large figures in these texts are forty thousand, eighty thousand, and one hundred thousand (fighters).
Indeed, all these three figures are liable to doubt and check, even the smallest of them. Now, you read the following explanations:
1. The largest figure is one hundred thousand or ninety thousand (fighters). Ziyad b. Abih referred to this figure. Only al-Dinawari has attributed it to Sulayman b. Sirt al-Khaza'i. This figure is unacceptable for several reasons:
The most important ones of these reasons are:
A. Both leaders (i.e., Sulayman and Ziyad) did not attend the pledge of allegiance to al-Hasan. They did not take part in the jihad of al-Hasan. They were not present during the succession of al-Hasan in Kufa. Generally speaking, they left their homeland in Iraq for two years. [7]
Thus they did not attend the situation that prevailed Kufa at that time. Namely, they did not witness the strong formation of the parties and the ignoble tardiness that spread all over Kufa, and with which the Kufans faced their Imam to whom they pledged allegiance. Therefore the figures they have mentioned are worthless.
When Sulayman and Ziyad mentioned these figures of the fighters, they compared the present period of Kufa with its past.. They thought that the Kufans mobilized fighters during the time of al-Hasan as they did during the time of his father, the Commander of the faithful, in the years 37 and 38 A.H.
B. The attitude of both men (i.e., Sulayman and Ziyad) at the emotional moment when they mentioned these figures indicate that they inclined to exaggeration. This exaggeration about the number of the army resulted from Sulayman's strong anger. Thus he censured Imam al-Hasan, peace be on him, for making peace with Mu'awiya. Also it resulted from the threat Ziyad made in response to Mu'awiya's threat.
Therefore there is nothing correct in these two figures. Thus we must not rely on them to determine the number of the army.
Besides we have known that Sulayman was the friend of al-Musayyab b. Nujayya. In other words Sulayman had ties with al-Musayyab other than the personal friendship. In text no. 4, you have read that al-Musayyab admonished al-Hasan for making peace with Mu'awiya:" You have forty thousand (fighters)." It is undeniable that these two friends did not differ over the affairs of the members of the House (Ahl al-Bayt) peace be on them, as they differed over these figures.
Accordingly, the reason for these unusual figures of Sulayman b. Sirt is that al-Dinawari, only who reported such reports about the matter of al-Hasan, did not check them out.
Fate had decided to punish these two leaders (Sulayman and Ziyad) before they left the life in this world. For they recklessly blamed Imam Abu Muhammad (i.e., al-Hasan), peace be on him, for making peace with Mu'awiya.
So in the year 65 A.H., eighteen thousand people pledged allegiance to Sulayman and Ziyad to avenge the blood of al-Husayn, peace be on him. When the Battle of `Ayn al-Warda took place, most people deserted them. Thus suffered from the desertion of the people.
Such kind of desertion reminded them of the attitude of the people towards the matters of the members of the House (Ahl al-Bayt), peace be on them.
Then Sulayman and al-Musayyab, who were the leaders of the Movement of the Repentant, were killed at the Battle of `Ayn al-Warda. Also most of their followers were killed on that day.
2. As for the number eighty thousand or seventy thousand fighters, it was mentioned by al-Hasan when he answered the man who asked him: "Were you right in what you have done."
The words of al-Hasan, in fact, indicate that he had not more than twenty thousand fighters according to the greatest assessment. That is because when al-Hasan mentioned those "whose jugular veins will bleed on the Day of Judgment," he ranged their number from seventy thousand to eighty thousand persons. By this number, he did not mean his soldiers in particular. Rather he meant the total number of the two fighting armies. Moreover, we have known that the number of the Syrians during their advance against al-Hasan was sixty thousand fighters. So the rest was the number of al-Hasan's private army.
Al-Hasan's hesitation in determining the number is clear in what we have mentioned. That is because if he had meant his army with the exception of the army of the others, he would have mentioned its number without hesitation. For he was the most knowledgeable of the people in the number of his army.
3. As for the number forty thousand fighters, it has been mentioned more than one historian. Also al-Musayyab b. Nujayya has mentioned it. We have nothing concerning this number but two ideas:
A. This number disagrees with al-Hasan's words with which he referred to the number of the army. You have known that his words do not mean more than twenty thousand fighters according to the greatest estimation. Also this number disagrees with his other words with which he described the attitude of the people towards him. Namely, he described their attitude as: "Sluggishness in fighting." [8] Thus if al-Hasan had forty thousand fighters, the people would not have been sluggish in fighting alongside him. So the number is still liable to doubt.
B. The doubt imposed the number on those who believed in it. So they thought that the Commander of the faithful, peace be on him, prepared forty thousand fighters for his final campaign against Sham (Syria). Then his holy life had ended before he advanced against Sham with this army. So they thought that the soldiers of the father (i.e., Imam 'Ali) were added to the soldiers of the son (i.e., al-Hasan). However, they forgot to mention the number of the people who deserted the new Successor in Kufa.
Therefore, the figure based on these errors is worthless.
Al-Zuhri's report is very unusual. For it denotes that there were forty thousand fighters with Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbada al-Ansari. They belonged to the army of al-Hasan. Namely, they were with Qays who became the commander of the vanguard in Maskan when `Ubayd Allah and his followers had escaped. This means that only the vanguard of al-Hasan had forty- eight thousand fighters before the events of escaping.
Thus this idea is incorrect in history.
The reports of al-Zuhri concerning the matters of the members of the house (Ahl al-Bayt) are the weakest of all reports, and the most confused of them all in subjects. The author of the book (Dirasat fi al-Islam) regarded al-Zuhri as a mercenary for the Umayyads. This is enough evidence for the weakness of his reports.
Al-Zuhri said: "Mu'awiya, `Amru, and the Syrians stopped at them." Now, we want to act freely with this narration of his. We want to correct this intentional confusion as follows: the above-mentioned words contain a pronoun that is `them.' If we attribute the pronoun to Mu'awiya's army and exclude Qays' army, then the number will concern Mu'awiya's soldiers with whom he met Qays. The concerned ones of them were those who received salaries. The concerned ones of the Syrians were the volunteers other than those who received salaries. In this way there will be coherence between this narration of his and the other narration that has added the soldiers of Mu'awiya to the vanguard of al-Hasan.
4. Ibn Abu al-Hadid has used the phrase `the great army' to describe the movement of al-Hasan from al-Nukhayla to Dir `Abd al-Rahman on his way to his camps. These words, as you see, are brief. They agree with the number that we have already mentioned. Indeed, sixteen thousand fighters were a great army. If you refuse that; then they were twenty thousand fighters.
5. The narration in the book `Bihar al-Anwar' is the best of all reports which we have mentioned to understand what has been reported about this matter. There is an order in the frequent events of this narration so that such an order imposes doubt on it.
When this narration shows the same events, it ignores the names of the two leaders (i.e., al-Kindi and al-Muradi). For this narration indicates that they met Mu'awiya before `Ubayd Allah. Also they deserted al-Hasan before him. In the history of such an event, the people do not know that ignoring the names of two leaders during two events is among the ugliest events of man in history.
Apart from ignoring the names of the two leaders, this narration which is in Bihar al-Anwar underlines that the Imam (al-Hasan) insisted on accusing the two leaders (of desertion) before he dispatched them. Moreover, this narration underlines that the Imam sent them to meet Mu'awiya though he was aware of their desertion.
Some of this (explanation) is enough so that we will not go on discussing this narration, for it is very easy to understand.
I (the author) say In spite of this discussion, we have not gotten any result about the matter which we have mentioned under the topic: The Number of the Army. These texts, though many, are some examples about the fabrications from which the matter of al-Hasan suffered. No wonder when we mention this fact (matter), repeat it, regard its danger as great, condemn it, and draw the attention of people to its results. These are eight texts. Not one of them is able to resist the discussion, so we cannot use them as historical proofs.
Then we have nothing except the number of the army of the vanguard, that was twelve thousand fighters, and the number of the volunteers in Kufa, that was four thousand fighters. Then we have to mention the groups of the people who came to al-Hasan at Dir `Abd al-Rahman when he stayed there for three days. They were about twenty thousand fighters. All these groups of people were the army of al-Hasan when he headed for his two camps at Maskan and al-Mada'in.
As for the fighters from al-Mada'in itself, they did not tarry from the battlefields headed by 'Ali, peace be on him. We have already mentioned that, so it was impossible for them to desert his son (al-Hasan) when he camped among them.
This is what makes us believe that the number of the army at both camps was twenty thousand fighters or little over.
This number was `the great army' which b. Abu al-Hadid meant. Also it is the number that agrees with the foregoing words of al Hasan, peace be on him. There is no proof better than al-Hasan's words concerning his matters.
Then we do not know whether al-Hasan, peace be on him, received any help from any party when he was in al-Mada'in.
[1] Al-Rawandi, al-Kharaij wa al-Jaraih, p. 228.
[2] A city was on the bank of the Euphrates (west of Baghdad). Anbar was ten leagues far from Baghdad. It was called so, for the stores (`anabir) of wheat and barley were gathered together in it during the days of the Persians. Abu al-`Abbas al-Saffih al-`Abbasi resided in it till he died. He rebuilt palaces and house in it, but they have become extinct.
[3] He was Abu al-Hasan b. Muhammad b. Abu Sayf al-Basri. He lived in al-Mada'in, then moved to Baghdad, and died there in the year 215 A.H. Ibn Abu al-Hadid reported many traditions on his authority. He, may Allah have mercy on him, has about two hundred books on various matters.
[4] He was `Ubayd Allah, neither `Abd Allah nor Qays. We have already mentioned the reasons for the error in mentioning each of them.
[5] Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 7. Ibn Kathir, al Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh vol. 8, p. 42.
[6] Al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh, vol. 2, p. 194. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh, vol. 3, p. 166.
The former has narrated that the number of the army was ninety' thousand fighters, while the latter has mentioned that it was seventy thousand fighters.
[7] Ibn Qutayba (in al-Imama wa al-Siyasa), and al-Murtada (in Tanzih al Anbiya') have mentioned that Sulayman was not in Kufa for two years. As for Ziyad, he was the governor of Basrah. Then `Abd Allah b. `Abbas dispatched him to Persia, to be a governor over it in the year 39 A.H. In the events of the year 39 A.H, al-Tabari mentioned that Ziyad was in Basrah before the year 39.
[8] Al-Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 10, p. 113.

Chapter 8

The Members Of The Army
In his book `al-Irshad p. 169, al-Mufid said: "Al-Hasan sent Hujr b. `Adi to order the leaders (Ummal) to set out and to call the people together for war (jihad). They were slow to (answer) him and then they came forward. (Al-Hasan) had a mixed band of men: some of them belonged to his Shi'a and to his father's; some of them were members of the Muhakkima (i.e., Kharijites) who were influenced by (the desires of) fighting Mu`awiya with every means (possible); some of them were men who loved discords and were anxious for booty; some of them were doubters; others were tribal supporters who followed the leaders of their tribes without reference to religion." [1]
I (the author) say: From what we have just said, we have known that the number of al-Hasan's army was about twenty thousand fighters or little more. However, we do not know in detail the way used to form this army. However, I think it was the primitive way which was not based on the succeeding, acquired improvements. It was the way which the Muslim communities followed during the first centuries A.H. It was the way that did not stipulate any qualities necessary for accepting the soldier or the fighter (mujahid). It did not stipulate personal abilities and age, nor did it stipulate compulsory military service as it is in the present time. For the Muslim person who was able to carry the weapon had a religious motive. Thus he took part in jihad willingly when he heard the summons to it in the way of Allah. This motive made him feel his religious obligation. So he was ready to sacrifice his life in the way of Allah. Otherwise, he was unable to carry out his religious duty. For the worldly desires would suppress this feeling in him. Moreover, they would have deprived him of his share of the reward and booty if Allah had predetermined victory and booty for that war.
Modern military laws force people to carry out military service, summon them in certain years, and examine their limited abilities. These laws were not known at that time. Besides they disagree with the Islamic law that is general and tolerant.
Islam is certain correct facts so that the people obey it. In other words the laws of this religion do not force anyone to carry out any obligation. For Islam has showed people two ways (i.e., the way of good and the way of evil). Moreover, it has helped them to choose the way of good through guidance: "And (as for) those who strive hard for us, We will most certainly guide them to Our ways." (Qur'an 29:69). In this way Islam enjoins people to do good and forbids them from doing evil. Also Muslim leaders have used the same way to enjoin people to do well and to prevent them from doing evil. When they decide to wage war (against their enemies), they follow an excellent way to urge people to take part in jihad (holy war) through convincing them to carry the weapon.
Among these ways are: They increase the salaries of fighters, order their governors to encourage people to take part in jihad, and spread their orators and prominent figures to urge people to volunteer to strive in the way of Allah, the Great and Almighty.
Al-Hasan, peace be on him, followed all these ways from the day when he assumed the succession in Kufa. Also he used them when he declared jihad. Among his measures, as we have said earlier, were: He increased the salaries of the fighters to 100%. He sent Hujr b. `Adi to his rulers to summon them to jihad. His. notable companions, who were orators, helped him with his task. Among them were `Adi b. Hatam, Ma'qal b. Qays al-Riyahi, Ziyad b. Sa'sa'a al-Tamimi, and Qays b. Sa'd al-Ansari. They criticized the people [2] for their slowness and urged them to take part in jihad for Allah. Then they themselves competed with each other for their places in the general camp, and they competed with the people for that.
They spread the standards of jihad all over Kufa. They summoned the people (to obey) Allah, the Great and Almighty, and the family of Muhammad, peace be on them.
Thus new awareness arose in the slow city. Namely, the Kufans felt their obligations, and became ready to carry them out.
The slowness in the war happened because either the people inclined to worldly pleasures or the Syrians changed their religious beliefs. This slowness included some of the people in Kufa and the regions around it.
As for this new awareness which the eloquent orators made, it soon created motivation in many of the slow people. The wish stirred up an activity. So enthusiasm resulted from the activity. To some extent, the summons of the Shi'a to jihad was successful in making the majority eager for war in spite of the ignoble attitudes of the oppressors in Kufa at that time. "The people became active for going out to their camp." [3]
Moreover, the summons of the Shi'a to jihad was successful, to a great extent, in winning the public opinion in Kufa, its sevenths (asba ), its tribes, and the neighboring outskirts whose dwellers used to come to markets and official offices.
The orators of al-Hasan were so skillful that they exploited the appropriate mind of the people. So they spared no effort to summon them to support the members of the House (Ahl al-Bayt) under the pretext of the summons to jihad.
The throats of the companions became hoarse because they mentioned many laudable qualities of the family of Muhammad. In the meantime they showed the defects of their enemies. They resisted the different clubs of Kufa, its districts, and its public places. They drew the attention of the people to the excellent position which no one of the Muslims occupied but the two lords of the youth of Paradise (i.e., al-Hasan and al-Husayn), peace be on them. They indicated the religious firmness inherited by the members of the House of Inspiration. They spread the distinguished qualities of this tribe such as knowledge, purity, religious devotion, sacrifice for Allah, and reforming acts. They indicated their obligatory love on the believers.
Then they (the orators of al-Hasan) mentioned the pledge of allegiance to al-Hasan. They reminded the people that Allah would ask them about obedience of these rulers and the obligatory pledge of allegiance to them.
They (the orators) mentioned the lineage in their enthusiastic sermons. Suddenly, this lineage was very nice, very truthful, and very effective. They bewildered the people and filled them with admiration.
The orators mentioned al-Hasan and Mu'awiya. They said: "What a great difference is between b. 'Ali and b. Sakhr! What a great difference is between b. Fatima and b. Hind! What a great difference is between his (i.e., al-Hasan's) grandfather the Apostle of Allah, may Allah bless him and his family, and his (i.e., Mu'awiya's) grandfather! What a great difference is between his (al-Hasan's) grandmother Khadija and his (i.e., Mu'awiya's) grandmother!" They cursed the more unknown one of the two persons (i.e., al-Hasan and Mu'awiya). Also they cursed the more ignoble one of them in lineage, the more evil one of them in the past and the present time, and the older one of them in unbelief and hypocrisy. So the people shouted and said: `Amen!' Then the generations came after them (the people). When a Muslim person reads this nice comparison, he will record a new amen against Mu'awiya.
These wise ways and enthusiastic eloquent orations played an important role in moving the people. So they were ready to desert Sham (Syria) and to support Kufa.
In Kufa, the new powerful city, there were mixed bands of people. They belonged to Arab and non- Arab communities. They adopted Islam, but they were displeased with it. In other words they embraced Islam and used it as means to achieve their immediate interests. So they understood the summons to jihad as means for interests and booty. When these mixed bands became satisfied with the success of that war, they joined the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him, to achieve their interests and to take their shares of booty. So why did they not join those who were the first to take part in jihad?
You may agree with me on discovering the motives that drove these rabble mixed groups to join the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him. Suddenly, the men of discords, the men of booty, the men of tribalism, the doubters, and the like became volunteers in the army of al-Hasan.
As we have previously said, the regulations of the Islamic mobilization at that time did not prevent the above mentioned groups from joining the army as fighters or mujhahidin. That is because these regulations stipulated only one condition that was the ability to carry the weapon.
Concerning the reason that urged the Kharijites to join the army of al-Hasan, Shaykh al-Mufid, my Allah have mercy on him, said: "They chose to fight Mu`awiya with every means (possible)."
However, we (i.e., the author) do not believe in this reason though brief, and we do not deny it because it has some meanings What al Mufid said might be part of their aim, and their aim might be a thing other than this.
The relations between al-Hasan, peace be on him, and the Kharijites do not encourage us to have a good opinion about them. Besides, if we study the events (of the Battle) of al-Nahrwan, our doubt in them will double. Suppose that they were right when they summoned al-Hasan to fight against Mu'awiya, and that they had no ill-intention towards him, then where were they during the lifetime of Mu'awiya? Why didn't they band together against him as they did against 'Ali, peace be on him? Moreover, hasn't history kept their revolt against the latter?
The enmity and malice of the Kharijites, and the way of their abominable summons move us to mistrust their purpose when they wanted to go out with: al-Hasan, peace be on him.
We have known the conditions of the Kharijites before their going out for that war. Namely, they cajoled the people. Meanwhile they complimented al-Hasan after their unbelieving fighting against the late Imam (i.e., 'Ali), peace be on him. Through that, they tried to avoid the general abhorrence that prevailed them after that great tragedy.
Do you not think that the Kharijites followed cunning ways? Didn't their timely pressing conditions make them pretend to be loyal soldiers, volunteers in the army of al-Hasan? Without doubt they had hidden their purposes under this pretense. So they became soldiers to achieve their hidden principles which no one has known since then.
The idea of the Kharijites represented an evil beginning that resulted from the matter of the arbitration (al-tahkim) at the Battle of Siffin. For this reason, they were call al-muhakkim. The roots of this idea were fixed in themselves as a firm thought. In the course of time, their idea spread here and there. Thus many people followed it. Therefore it created various kinds of disasters and hardships.
Although the Kharijites were intense in the matter of the religion, they did cunning very well.
So the Kharijites seized the opportunities of the war that took place between the two great enemies. They joined this army that moved from Kufa to Maskan and al-Mada'in.
Through these explanations, I do not want to deny the enmity of the Kharijites towards Mu'awiya. Moreover, I do not deny their choice to fight against him with every means (possible), as Shaykh al-Mufid, may Allah have mercy on him, has said. However, I think that the Kharijites intended to achieve two purposes through their plan. They had no purpose through their revolts and plots but to destroy the great Islamic figures in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. The purposes of these people were secret assassinations. These purposes prevailed their other plans. For this reason, they went with al-Hasan to make discords. They followed the way of jihad to make corruption. For example, they achieved a traitorous act at Mazlam Sabat. [4] The act harmed al-Hasan very much. It was the second dangerous part of the series of the crimes which this evil band committed against the great, Prophetic family.
Both those two crimes resulted from the active, secret plots which the foolish Kharijites mastered on various occasions.
Ibn. Sinan al-Asadi [5] stabbed al-Hasan. Also Ibn. Muljim al-Muradi, Sinan's friend, stabbed the Commander of the faithful, al-Hasan's father, peace be on him. Through His favor, Allah wanted these two stabs to be different from each other.
This mean plot represented the ugliest estrangement towards the Apostle of Allah, may Allah bless him and his family. For, through this stab, b. Sinan tried to kill his eldest grandson, and to render a rare service to Mu'awiya. This stab belonged to the people (i.e., the Kharijites) about whom it was said: "They went out with al-Hasan because they chose to fight against Mu'awiya with every means (possible)."
In this way, al-Hasan became certain of the intentions of the muhakkima (i.e., the Kharijites) in spite of their false flatter for him. From the beginning, al-Hasan was very cautious of them. Still he treated them kindly in spite of their hidden spites.
There is no one more dangerous than the enemy who pretends friendship. Such an enemy shows you friendship openly, but he fights against you secretly. So the most dangerous enemy is he who fights against you with hatred, malice, and tribalism, as the Kharijites did against al-Hasan.
In this way, the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him, was full of those mixed bands who discouraged it from winning the battles. It was also afflicted by the plots of both internal and external enemies, namely in Iraq and Syria (Sham).
It was natural for such an army to be liable to internal discords and mutiny against its commanders.
The holy war (jihad) was not some means for material greed, nor was it a field for dangerous plots, nor was it an aspect for trivial, ignorant tribalism, nor was it an arena for the experiences of the doubters.
So "the insight of al-Hasan increased when the people (i.e., the mixed bands) deserted him. [6]
Many words have been reported on the authority of al-Hasan. They indicate that he had low confidence in his army.
Al-Hasan said very eloquent words when he addressed his army in al-Mada'in. These words are appropriate for the subject of this chapter. Thus we will mention them here: "During your movement towards Siffin, your religion was before your life in this world. Anyhow today, your life in this world is before your religion. So you are between two killed persons: one was killed at (the Battle of) Siffin and you weep over him. The other was killed at (the Battle of) Nahrawan [7] and you avenge his blood. As for the rest, they are betrayers. As for the weepers, they are revolutionaries."
This is the only oration of al-Hasan, in which he refers to the inclinations and desires of the mixed bands in his army during the battles.
As for the revolutionary weepers, al-Hasan refers to the large number from his companions and his bosom ones. As for those who wanted to avenge the blood, he refers to the Kharijites who were in his army. Namely, they wanted to avenge the blood of their companions on al-Hasan. As for the betrayers, he refers to the other groups from the men of the discords, the followers of the ambitions, and the worshippers of desires.
Go over the pages of history. You will find gloomy bloody lines in them. That was because of what the captivated prominent figures from those mixed bands followed. Also it was because of their terrible deeds with which they corrupted the field of the holy war (jihad). Some of their deeds were treason, discords, breaking pledges, plots, forgetting the religion, and the like. So the rest of the family of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and his family, were liable to their attacks. We will mention some of these tragic pictures in their appropriate places in this book.

Conclusion
Here, we have to listen to what sounds in the mind of people when they study this sorrowful presentation about the bands of the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him. They ask: "Why did al-Hasan permit these mixed bands to join his army? After their joining his army, why was he slow in purifying his army from them? Why did he not use the methods that commanders of armies use to purify their armies such as dismissing corrupt members, censuring them, and banishing them?
These questions are the secret of the matter of al-Hasan. In response to these questions, we say:
1. Islam has abolished classes in jihad as it has abolished them in society through its laws and regulations. So it is unfair for the rulers to differentiate among the classes of Muslims who want to be soldiers. That is because such soldiers believe in Islam and are able to carry weapons. As for those mixed bands who followed al-Hasan, they believed in Islam and were able to carry weapons. Thus it was incumbent on the Imam to accept them according to the Islamic law.
2. The Prophet himself, may Allah bless him and his family, and such groups afflicted the Commander of the faithful during their battles. It is reported on their authority that they permitted such soldiers to enter their armies though they suffered from their disturbances at battlefields.
Concerning the Battle of Hunayn, the historians said: "Some Muslims saw the large number of their army, so they admired it. Then they said that the small army of their enemy would not overcome. However, the army of the Muslims was mixed. Among them (the Muslims) were many of those who came for booty."
The events of the returning of the Muslims from the campaign against the Banu al-Mustalaq indicates the existence of such mixed bands in the army of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and his family.
Also concerning the army of 'Ali, peace be on him, the historians said: "The army of 'Ali at (the Battle of) Siffin had mixed bands. They belonged to various tribes and communities. They were disobedient and opposing. They did not yield to any command, nor did they take any advice."
In his book (al-Mahasin wa al-Masawi'), al-Bayhaqi has narrated the following on the authority of Mu'awiya, who said: "He (i.e., 'Ali), peace be on him, was among the most wicked army and the most one of them in disagreement. I (i.e., Mu'awiya) was among the most obedient army and the least of them in disagreement."
I (the author) say: So al-Hasan had to follow the Sunna (practice) of his grandfather and that of his father. For it was enough for him to follow their example.
Al-Hasan conformed to Islam and fear of Allah in every movement and silence. Still the opponents of al-Hasan did not conform to these Islamic manners. Were it not for that (i.e., al-Hasan's fear of Allah and his conforming to Islam), you would find that the history of that period would be written in a way different from what you read today.
3. Nevertheless, al-Hasan refused to treat the situation through these ways. The commanders of armies use ways to purify their armies from corrupt persons. For example, they kill them, remove them from office, scold them, and the like. For he did not want to hasten the disaster before its time, as we have mentioned in chapter four. Besides he did want to be the direct reason for stirring up discords, declaring disagreement, and raising the banner of disobedience, at least, in half of his army. This means that al-Hasan intentionally wanted to light the fire of the revolt in the core of his army. Also this means that the holy war (Jihad) would turn into violent internal war. If al-Hasan had taken such steps, he would have achieved Mu'awiya's hopes. For the latter did his best to sow division between al-Hasan and his companions. Thus al-Hasan was very careful of Mu'awiya's tricks.
Moreover, al-Hasan, peace be on him, had no opportunity to reform those mixed bands of people and to unify their ideas, for his time was short and was full of various disasters. In other words, no one, except Allah (the Great and Almighty), was able to reform that situation at that time. That is because the manners, the religion, and the inherited backgrounds of the community were in need of reform during that short time. Moreover, the opposing trends that brought about various kinds of temptation to that generation prevented al Hasan from reforming the members of his army and unifying their ideas. Thus al-Hasan had to treat the situation through the ambitions themselves. This means that he had to cure the illness through the illness. However, he was not ready to follow such a way, for he took the fear of Allah into consideration.
[1] Also see: Al-Arbali, Kashif al-Ghumma, p. 161. Al-Majlisi, Bihar al Anwar, vol. 10, p. 110.
[2] Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 14.
[3] Ibid.
[4] In Arabic, Sabat means a shelter between two houses through which there is an open way. Sabat was a village in al-Mada'in. Near Sabat there was an arch over the river of the King (nahr al-malik). Maybe it was called so because there was a rare shelter among the shelters (Sawabit) in it. We think that this rare shelter was Mazlam Sabat.
[5] In his book (al-Dawla al-Amawiya fi al-Sham wa al-Andalus, p. 50, chapter 4.), Hasan Murad made a mistake when he attributed the stab of al Hasan, peace be on him, with the dagger to the followers of the Umayyads, excluding the Kharijites. In chapter, the Secret of the Attitude, you will read the texts of the event which the old historians reported, and which the modern historians should understand.
[6] Al-Mufid, al-Irshad, p. 170.
[7] In his book [al-Malahim wa al-Fitan, p. 142, (Najaf, 1368)], Ibn Tawus has narrated: "And the other was killed at (the Battle of) Nahrwan and you avenge his blood on us."