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(1) Infidelity
The threat of damnation is not issued exclusively to the infidels; rather, it is issued to all mankind, and infidelity is stated as a condition whose recompense is hell. However, because of its importance as the primary condition for damnation under discussion, several points should be noted about the concept of infidelity before any other conditions regarding the damnation of the infidels are considered. The term infidelity (kufr), and its cognates, such as infidel (kafir), have different meanings in different contexts.
For example, there is a legal definition used with regard to such issues as inheritance and marriage. It cannot be assumed, however, that in every verse in which these terms occur the legal definition gives the appropriate meaning. Even in different legal contexts, the meaning can differ. For example, the injunction to slay the disbelievers in time of war is generally interpreted as pertaining to combatant disbelievers, and not to women, children and the infirm. Some exegetes have claimed that legal condemnations of the pagans (mushriqin) in the Qur'an pertain only to the pagans of the Arabian peninsula during the tune of the Prophet Muhammad (s), while others have offered broader interpretations.
The legal definitions of infidelity are not relevant to the question of salvation, for the legal definitions pertain to issues concerning how non Muslins are to be treated according to Islamic law, while the question of salvation pertains to the inner state of the individual. The literal meaning of infidelity (kufr) is covering. The infidel is one who seeks to shield or cover himself from the truth of Islam. Infidelity is not a passive condition applying to all those who lack correct belief in Islam, rather it is an active inward opposition which prevents a person from accepting divine guidance. What damns the infidel is his own interior defiance of God and rejection of the divine guidance He sent through His prophets ('a). His own infidelity veils the infidel from God, and it is this separation which is damnation.
(2) Conditions
The Shi'i theologians generally agree that the threat of damnation does not apply to all who lack correct belief. The obvious exceptions are children who have not reached the age of reason, the insane and feeble minded. Other groups exempt from the threat of damnation for their incorrect beliefs mentioned in narrations are the deaf and dumb and those who died between the periods in which prophets were sent.[50]
There is disagreement about exactly what is to happen to these groups, called incapable (qasir), in the afterlife. According to some narrations, there will be a trial on the Last Day for these people in which a prophet will be sent to then and will call them from within a fire. Those who enter the fire will be saved and those who do not will enter the tire of hell. Shaykh Saduq, however, rejects these narrations on the grounds that they conflict with others according to which there are no responsibilities on the Day of Judgment. Others claim that those who were incapable in this world are an exception. According to Fayd Kashani, the call from the fire is to be understood as the reflection in the other world of the trial in this world to live righteously, and the call of the prophet from the fire is the other worldly form of the call of moral conscience in this world.[51
In any case, there is general agreement among the Shi'i scholars that the groups mentioned above may be spared from damnation despite their incorrect beliefs. Those called incapable (qasir) are distinguished from the negligent (muqassir), who have incorrect beliefs through their own fault, because of prejudice, dogmatism, pride, laziness, and the like.
Shahid Mutahhari's solution to the problem of religious pluralism is based on this distinction, however, he expands the category of the incapable to include all those who are unable through no fault of their own to admit the truth of Islam. Those who are incapable may be divided into two groups: those who lack the mental capacity to discern the truth and those to whom the truth is not made manifest, although they are fully rational. The first group includes children, the insane and feeble minded. Of greater interest, however, is the second group, which includes the deaf and those born between prophets, to which Shahid Mutahhari adds those whom he calls mustad'af, those made unfortunate either by oppression or other circumstances.
The extension of the class of the incapable is a natural result of rational reflection on the groups mentioned in the narrations. It is not deafness, per se, which excuses a person from heeding the call of Islam, but the result presumed to follow from deafness in centuries past, that the deaf would not be expected to have become familiar with the teachings of Islam. If the deaf person, however, is able to read or sign and the person is educated and the teachings of Islam are made known to him, then he will become responsible for accepting or rejecting the truth. What is at issue is the manifestation of the truth, not deafness, as is indicated in the noble verse quoted above, in the phrase "after guidance has become manifested to him" (4:115).
This is the central condition for responsible choice of creed. Likewise, those who were born between prophets are presumed to lack knowledge of the divine message they brought. But if such a person were a scholar and understood what had been previously revealed, it would be incumbent upon him to heed the divine call. On the other hand, one born in the present age, but in a remote area of the world to which the teachings of Islam had not reached, cannot be held accountable for his failure to embrace Islam.
Shahid Mutahhari extends this point to cover those who for any reason (for which they themselves cannot be held responsible) are unable to understand the message of Islam. Someone who has been brought up in an atmosphere poisoned by propaganda spread by the enemies of Islam may be no more capable of understanding the message of Islam than one living in a remote region physically cut off from all contact with the Islamic world. Even if that person is a scholar for whom a library of books about Islam is available, still the comprehension of the message of Islam for such a person may be as difficult as for those who lack the requisite mental health. Perhaps those whom Shahid Mutahhari castigates as "narrow minded dry holy ones" (tang nazari khoshk muqaddasan) will argue on the basis of the following noble verse that if one really sought the truth, God would somehow show the way to Islam (in the specific sense):
"And those who strive hard in Us, certainly We guide them in Our ways" (Al-Quran, 29:69).
However, such a conclusion cannot validly be drawn from this verse for two reasons. First, the guidance God may provide to the true seekers may be moral wisdom without the ability to arrive at information about the revelation given to the last of His prophets, as God may guide and grant wisdom to those who sincerely seek but who live in regions where the message of Islam has not reached. Second, it is not clear that the phrase "those who strive hard in Us" is to be interpreted so as to include all sincere searchers, for similar words are used in the Qur'an in various places with a much more narrow meaning to signify only those who were already true believers and had struggled on behalf of Islam.[52]
Shahid Mutahhari argues that salvation is not a matter of an arbitrary decision by God, but is the natural result of one's life. It is not conventional (qarardadi), but ontological (takwini). He also emphasizes that both salvation and damnation come in various degrees, and that the latter is not always eternal. Likewise, Islam itself comes in degrees from the innate desire for truth and goodness found at least latently in all human beings to the faith and righteousness of the special friends of Allah, the awliya. No one is locked out of heaven because they fail to subscribe to the right creed; but solve incorrect beliefs can prevent one from effectively purifying oneself, and thus, indirectly, lead to wretchedness.[53]
Thus, in Islam we find a rationale for insistence on right belief as that which guides one toward felicity, while at the same time there need not be any rigid exclusivism based on creed. To understand how it is possible to reach ultimate felicity even for those who do not follow the right path, the path made obligatory for all mankind in the present age, it should be recalled that what invalidates the previously ordained religions is not that they contain no truth. God revealed the previous religions with the capacity to guide man toward perfection and salvation. That inherent capacity is not destroyed with the arrival of a new covenant, yet one who clings stubbornly to the old after the revelation of the new is surely wretched, for in this case the failure to accept the new covenant becomes rebellion against God
According to non-reductive pluralism, correct faith is required but not necessary for salvation. Correct faith is required in the sense that it is made obligatory by the command of God. Correct faith is not necessary in the sense that it is possible for a person to be saved by the grace of God even though this obligation is not fulfilled. Different degrees of non-reductive pluralism will allow for more or less variance from correct belief. At the time of the Prophet of Islam, may the Peace and Blessings of Allah be with him and with his folk, Jews and Christians were considered to have incorrect beliefs, yet despite such incorrect beliefs God will not deny them their appropriate rewards. In two verses of the Qur'an, reward is even promised to the Sabeans, who many commentators agree were star worshippers, provided they believe in Allah and the Last Day and do
good:
Verily, those who believe, and those who are Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabeans, whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does good, they shall have their reward front their Lord, and there shall be no fear for them, nor shall they grieve. (Al-Quran, 2: 62) [54]
As should be expected, there is some controversy about the correct interpretation of this verse among exegetes. Muslim exclusivists interpret it as meaning that the non-Muslims (in the specific sense) who were followers of other ways during the periods in which those ways were ordained have nothing to fear, while present day followers of other religions cannot achieve salvation. They argue that if the verse were interpreted to include non-ÂMuslims during the period following the advent of Islam, it would conflict with the noble verse:
"And whoever seeks any religion other than Islam never shall it be accepted from him, and in the next world he shall be among the losers." (Al-Quran, 3:84)
However, there is no conflict with the inclusivist reading of the former verse, provided the latter verse is understood as referring to Islam in the general sense of total submission to Allah. On the other hand, (2:62) is not to be interpreted as meaning that more than one religion is divinely ordained during the present age. Rather, (2:62) may be understood as allowing that those who are incapable (qasir) but who live righteously may be saved.
This reading of the verse is certainly more reasonable than the exclusivist's, for what is at issue is the manifestation of the universal call of Islam, and as far as the issue of salvation is concerned, it makes no difference whether the call has not become manifest to a person because of the time during which he has lived or because of the remoteness of the region in which he lives, or for some other reason. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity, not to mention star-worship, is irreconcilable with Islamic monotheism, yet despite the recognition of irresolvable differences in belief, salvation is not to be denied on the basis of false belief alone. This, however, is not to say that all beliefs are equally conducive to salvation.
According to Islamic doctrine, ultimate felicity is most effectively promoted through belief in the teachings of God Himself in the Qur'an, as elaborated by the last of His prophets (s). Some forms of belief, on the other hand, like the worship of Lat and, Uzza by the pagan Arabs, are absolutely devoid of any truth and lead to wretchedness rather than to felicity. The People of the Book, Jews and Christians, despite irreconcilable differences in their beliefs with the teachings of Islam, may also be saved, provided that their incorrect belief is through no fault of their own.
Since their religions were originally divinely inspired, they may even be drawn nigh to God by means of the divine truth contained in their religions. It is even possibly that in like manner the followers of Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist, and other ways may reach paradise provided that their rejection of Islam is due to ignorance of Islam rather than prejudice against Islam, i.e., that they are to be considered qasir (incapable) rather than muqassir (negligent), for we cannot definitively rule that the followers of religions other than Judaism, Christianity and Islam are not "People of the Book", because it is impossible to determine that the original teachings contained in these religions were not brought by a prophet of Allah.
The divergence between the content of their scriptures and teachings from those of Islam do not prove that the original teachings were not in essence the same. For although the scriptures and teachings of Christianity are inconsistent with those of Islam, this is explained by the erosion (tahrif) of the original teachings, and there is no reason why a similar strategy could not be used to explain the possibility that non ÂAbrahamic religions might be divinely revealed religions.[55]
So, one who is incapable (qasir) may be able to achieve salvation by means of the divine truth which is contained in the religion he falsely believed to be presently required by God. However, the question of the salvation of the incapable (qasir) is not decided merely on the basis of the truth or falsity of the teachings contained in his religion or system of beliefs, but also on the basis of one's reasons for belief. No matter how aberrant one's faith, if it is accompanied by absolutely sincere intention this sincerity by itself may win the favor of God, for sincerity itself is at the core of submission (islam).
This point is best illustrated by Rumi's famous story of Moses and the shepherd.[56] According to the story, God accepts the devotion of the shepherd despite the fact that he holds absurdly anthropomorphic beliefs about the deity, because of the simple purity of the shepherd's love of God. A related point concerns the divine reward (thawab) granted to the expert in Islamic law, the mujtahid, for his legal decisions.
If the mujtahid comes to a wrong decision by honest mistake rather than by negligence, then although his decision is wrong, it still merits reward, and it must be carried out. In this case, to act properly, if this is believed to be improper, will itself be wrong. Now, in matters pertaining to the fundamental principles of religion, imitation (taqlid) is forbidden, and all must use the best of their abilities to determine what the correct faith is. So, in this area, every one is a mujtahid.
In short, the threat of damnation is conditioned not merely on disbelief or incorrect belief, but on sinful disbelief or incorrect belief. Wrong belief is not sinful for those who are incapable (qasir), but only for the negligent (muqassir). The negligent are like the hypocrites, for both proclaim outwardly what they deny inwardly. The hypocrites proclaim Islam with their tongues, but deny it in their Hearts. At the same time, the hypocrite knows in the depths of his heart that Islam is true, but he does not act in accordance with it, so that his outward profession becomes a denial of Islam. Likewise, the negligent proclaim that they seek the truth with their tongues, but in their hearts they hide from the truth.
At the same time, the negligent knows in the depths of his heart that there is a truth which he avoids, so that his outward profession of truth seeking coupled with his failure to actually pursue the truth becomes a denial of the truth. And so, it is appropriate that we find the promise of hell for the infidel so often joined with that of the hypocrite.
"Allah has promised the hypocrite men and the hypocrite women and the infidels the fire of hell to abide therein; this suffices for them, and Allah has cursed them, and for them is a lasting chastisement." (Al-Quran, 9:68)[57]
There is no way for us to say of any given individual that his disbelief is sinful or not (except for a few individuals whose fates have been revealed). The difference between the incapable (qasir) and the negligent (muqassir) lies within the heart.
This, too, is a point stressed by Shahid Mutahhari, who refers to the example of whether Louis Pasteur is damned despite his service to mankind: "Not only with specific regard to Pasteur, but fundamentally, the reckoning of individuals is in the Hands of God. No one has a right to express a definite view about someone whether he is in heaven or hell."[58] Even the Prophet (s) did not have knowledge about what would happen to specific individuals in the hereafter except by divine revelation.[59]
Shahid Mutahhari's expansion of the concept of the incapable (qasir) marks a major moral advance in Shi`i theology, for it reaffirms the tie between moral responsibility and otherworldly rewards and punishments which had become endangered by overemphasis on doctrinal orthodoxy. Shahid Mutahhari ridicules the idea that heaven should be reserved only for that tiny minority of the human population which accepts all the doctrines of the Shi'i theologians, and while in hardly any particular instance can we claim to have knowledge about who is incapable and who is negligent, in the view of Shahid Mutahhari it is not unlikely that great numbers of infidels are incapable.
The Threat
The question to be raised next is whether eternal damnation is the necessary consequence of sinfully incorrect belief, the incorrect belief of the negligent (muqassir). On the general issue of whether God must carry out His threats and promises it is customary to divide the theologians into three groups. According to the Ash'arites, whatever God does is to be considered just by virtue of accordance with the divine will. If the ultimate purpose were decadence and pain, then they would be just and good. Hence, they field that there is no need for God to keep his promises. If He decided to reward the disbelievers and punish the believers, this would be no less just than the opposite policy.
According to the Mu'tazilites, on the other hand, God is necessarily just, and therefore He cannot break His promises of heavenly reward nor can He fail to carry out His threats of eternal damnation. The Shi'i theologians, for the most part, have taken a third position. They hold that since His mercy has precedence over its justice, God cannot break His promises of rewards, but He may forgive those who are threatened with eternal damnation. No one can place any limit on the extent of the grace of God. Even though the hypocrites are consigned to the lowest level of hell, the possibility of divine mercy is explicitly stated in the Qur'an.[60] Nevertheless, unrepentant sinful infidelity is usually treated as an exception and is considered to result in eternal damnation without hope of reprieve.[61]
There has been some disagreement over whether the infidels will be rewarded for their good deeds. Some have held that there can be no reward for the negligent infidel at all. Others have held that reward may take the form of a decrease in the torments of hell.[62] On the other hand, from the time of Shaykh Mufid the theologians have generally held that no one with orthodox Shi'i beliefs will suffer eternal damnation.[63]
Thus, the concept of divine rewards and punishments degenerated to the point that it was imagined to turn entirely on one's doctrinal allegiances. However, this idea is not firmly grounded in the Qur'an and ahadith, but is claimed to be supported by rational argument, and the rational argument is far from convincing. It is held that the sinful orthodox must be rewarded for their orthodoxy (which is mistaken for faith) and that if the reward were to come prior to eternal punishment, the reward would be spoiled, and if it comes after punishment, the punishment cannot be eternal.[64]
However, God could make the sinner forget that eternal punishment was coming during the period of reward, and He could alternate a year of punishment with a year of reward, so that both could be eternal, or He could limit the reward to a reduction in the intensity of the torments of hell. A better reason for holding that reward must follow punishment is to be found in the idea that reward in the afterlife is conditioned by a level of perfection and purification of the soul which is reached only after some burning.
However, the reward for faith will guarantee eventual salvation despite major sins only if faith is understood as something much deeper than doctrinal affiliation, and in that case, the commission of major sin which is not absolved by repentance casts doubt upon the presence of real faith. The sinner must fear eternal damnation, and should not fund any solace in the orthodoxy of his beliefs. The story, no doubt apocryphal, is told that when Shaykh Bayazid enjoyed great popularity among the people, God said to him that if He were to reveal his secrets, the people would stone him.
Bayazid replied that if he told the people the secret of the abundance of His mercy, none would obey Him. God agreed that the secrets should be kept! Rather than resting confident with the implications of such stories, it would seem more reasonable to hold that all responsible human beings, whatever their beliefs, should live in fear of the divine punishment they deserve, and in hope of God's grace.
It has been argued that since it is stated in the Qur'an that idolatry (shirk) will not be forgiven,[65] at least the unrepentant sinful idolater must suffer eternal damnation. However, the verse alluded to does not, by itself, prove the point, for without further evidence, whether rational or transmitted, it cannot be assumed that God's refusal to forgive the idolater must result in His failure to offer him any grace. The refusal to forgive idolatry would be preserved even if it only prevented the idolater from reaching some high station in heaven.
If idolatry will truly prevent one from salvation, it must be understood in a way more profound than the acceptance of a pantheon of deities to be worshipped. What may be called ontological idolatry must be understood in a manner more clearly expressed by the Arabic shirk, which is usually translated as 'assigning partners to God'.
Then the strategy for showing that shirk prevents one from attaining salvation would be to show that shirk is incompatible with the kind of purity of heart required for salvation. In any case, the above discussion pertains only to negligent infidelity, not incapable infidelity. God does not reward sin of any sort, let alone sinful infidelity; but to insist that His grace is unlimited is to indicate the room for hope that even those considered most wicked may, by the grace of God, find the way to true repentance. No one can put limits on the grace of God,
"and that grace is in the hand of Allah, He bestows it on whom He will, and Allah is Lord of Mighty Grace." (Al-Quran, 57:29)
Conclusion
There remains one more important question related to the topic of religious pluralism which will only be touched upon here: its practical implications. One of the major motivations for liberal Christian religious pluralists was to provide the theological groundwork for better relations between Christians and non-Christians. Instead of viewing the non-Christian with contempt as damned, he is seen by the Christian pluralist as in essential agreement with Christianity, for all the major religions are held to differ only in their external aspects.
Differences in religion are to be understood on the model of ethnic differences, and relations among the participants in different faith traditions are presumed to take shape within the framework of the liberal state, which proclaims complete religious neutrality while in fact it embodies the values of the dominant strand of main stream Protestant thinking. In Islamic thought, to the contrary, religious differences are not seen as a matter of personal preference, but as expressions of communal loyalty grounded in spiritual insight and critical evaluation.
Those who chose a religion other than Islam are making a mistake, either sinfully or excusably. Since there is no way for us to tell whether or not the mistake is excusable, where good relations with non-Muslims are possible without condoning injustice, the presumption of an honest mistake is morally incumbent upon us. Good relations with non-Muslims are to take place either through agreement contracted by the parties involved, in the case of Muslims and non-ÂMuslims of different countries by observing the courtesy prescribed by Islamic etiquette (adab), or within the framework of Islamic governance, which has traditionally offered semi-autonomous status to the non-Muslin communities living within its jurisdiction who submit to its authority.
Due to the force of European arms and the weaknesses of rival Muslin powers, whatever traces of the system of Islamic governance that remained in the nineteenth century, were effectively wiped out and replaced by the system of nation-states. Muslins are only beginning to regain control of their lands, and the first steps toward Islamic governance are being taken, the most prominent such step being the Islamic Revolution of Iran.
The system of tribute (jizyah) and protection for semi-autonomous communities of free non-Muslim citizens (ahl al-dhimmah) has not been revived yet, and while it may have been abused in some cases in the past, it holds the promise of greater freedom than that available within the framework of the liberal state. In Christianity, especially in Protestant Christianity, there is a strong link between salvation and true belief, because it is through faith that one participates in the Redemption, which alone is believed to afford salvation.
This link between true belief and salvation survives among Christian proposals for religious pluralism, like those of Wilfred Cantwell Smith[66] and John Hick, in the idea that ultimately the variety of religious beliefs is a matter of surface differences over a fundamentally single faith, which may not even be expressible in human language. If one denies the doctrine of Redemption, and with it the link between faith and salvation which features so prominently in Christian thought, the obvious alternative, at least obvious in a Christian context, is the idea that faith is to be purchased through good works, an idea emphatically denounced by Luther and by the majority of Christian theologians, including Catholics, after him.
The Islamic tradition appears to offer another approach to the problem. Muslims, like Christians, reject the idea that good works alone are sufficient for salvation. Like Christian writings on the subject, it is not difficult to find Muslim expressions of the idea that there is nothing one can do through one's own efforts to make oneself worthy of salvation without the grace of God. This is a theme which runs throughout Imam Zayn al-'Abidin's Sahifat al-Sajjadiyah.[67]
Good works without faith appear ungrounded, for faith provides the cognitive framework in which the final good is to be understood and intentions to do good works are to be formed, and it is through such orientation and intentions that God draws His servants toward Him by His Mercy. But faith is more than the mere acceptance of a list of doctrines, it is a spiritual readiness to fare the way toward Allah and wholehearted submission to His will. In Islam, salvation is seen in terms of the movement of the soul toward God, a movement which in turn is explained in terms of the acquirement of the Divine attributes, and whose aim is a beatific encounter with Divinity, liqa' Allah.
To achieve this, God demands faith and good works, and in the present age, this means the acceptance and practice of Islam as revealed to the last of His chosen messengers (s); ultimately, however, it is neither by faith nor good works that man is saved, but by the grace of God. An Islamic non-reductive pluralism may be contrasted with Hick's pluralism and Rahner's inclusivism in terms of the place of ignorance in the three views
In Hick's view every major creed, no matter how different, expresses an ultimately single faith. That ultimate faith may not be expressible in human language, so there is a sense in which believers are ignorant of what they really believe. On Rahner's view Christians know what they believe and it is only others who may be ignorant of their latent Christian belief. On the non-reductive view, there is no attempt to reinterpret apparently conflicting beliefs to reveal some hidden agreement.
Instead of positing ignorance about what we believe, we are to admit our ignorance of how God may guide the sincere, and what beliefs are the result of a sincere quest for the truth.. The identities of all the prophets are not known, and in the most famous hadith about the number of the prophets, Abu Dharr reports that the Prophet told him there were one hundred twenty-four thousand prophets. Corrupted forms of the teachings of these prophets may survive in any number of the variety of the world's religions.
The admission of ignorance in this matter is an expression of humility before the judgment of Allah; such humility has featured prominently in the Islamic tradition, and it may provide a basis for an Islamic form of a non-reductive religious pluralism. After mentioning some of the good people who will be saved and the hypocrites who will receive a double chastisement, the Qur'an mentions that there are others who must await the command of God. Until then, we cannot say whether they will be rewarded or punished:
And others must await the command of Allah, whether We will chastise them or whether He will turn to them. And Allah is all Knowing, all Wise. (Al-Quran, 9:106)[68]
John Hick's religious pluralism is to be lauded as a great improvement over its exclusivist and inclusivist predecessors in Christian theology, and Muslims will be impressed by the fact that the denial of the traditional Christian dogma of' the Incarnation brings Hick's theology much closer to Islamic doctrine. Nevertheless, Hick's reductive pluralism hides a set of moral and political values which are at odds with Islam.
'They are at odds with Islam not only because of the detail of the judgments they inform, but, even more significantly, because of where they set their standards. Islam teaches that we are to look to the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet (s) to find guidance in politics and morals, while Hick would have us turn to the worldly currents of modern thought, which are more often than not decidedly opposed to Islam.
And although a severe punishment awaits the enemies of Islam, as for those who honestly accept an invalid creed, it must be admitted that this invalid creed itself may be the vehicle through which God extends to them His grace and leads them to salvation. What is truly of value in Hick's religious pluralism is a tolerance which can be found more completely, in a sense, within the Islamic tradition, and may be formulated along the lines suggested above as a non-reductive religious pluralism.
Notes:
[1] See Richard Vernon, "John Stuart Mill and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle", Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 3, (1996), pps. 621-632.
[2] See Stephen Muthall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) and Ronald Beincr, What's the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkceley: University of California Press, 1992).
[3] The topic of' religious pluralism is taken up in almost all of Hick's major works, cited individually below. In addition to these, there are the anthologies, Truth and Dialogue in World Religions, ed. John Hick (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974) and The Myth qf Christian Uniqueness, ed., John Hick and Paul Knitter (London: SCM Press, 1988). In response to the latter anthology, there is Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered; The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, Gavin D'Costa, ed., (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990). The topic of religious pluralism has become one of the most widely discussed issues in religious studies. To mention just a Couple more of the collections of essays devoted to the topic, there are Religious Pluralism, Leroy S. Rouner, ed., (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and Religious Pluralisrm and Unbelief, ed. Ian Hamnett (London: Routledge, 1990).
[4] John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 34.
[5] Just as the Arabic word for martyr, shahid, derives from the verb shahada, meaning he bore witness, the English word martyr is derived from the Greek, martys, meaning to witness (and not from the Latin mort, as erroneously stated by Dr. Shari'ati. See Jihad and Shahadat Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, ed. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen (Houston: IRIS, 1986), pps. 230, 242).
[6] John Hick, ed., The Myth of God Incarnate (London: SCM Press, 1977). The controversy spawned by this book is described by Hick in the opening essay, "Three Controversies", of his Problems of Religious Pluralism.
[7] John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 233.
[8] William J. Wainwright, Philosophy of Religion (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1988), p. 158.
[9] Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendental Unity of Religions, revised edition, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975).
[10] See the articles by Katz in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) and Mysticism and Religious Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
[11] John Hick, Art Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale, 1989), p. 243.
[12] From the Mathnavi, Book III, line 1259 ff..
[13] Peter Byrne, "John Hick's Philosophy of World Religions," Scottish Journal of Theology 35, no. 4, (1982), p. 297, cited in Michael Peterson, William Masker, Bruce Reichenbach and David Basinger, Reason and Religious Belief', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 227. See Hick's response to Byrne in Problems of Religious Pluralism, 102-107
[14] In his Perceiving God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pps. 255-285.
[15] Ibid, p. 266.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Peterson, et. al., (1991), p. 227.
[18] Ninian Smart, "Truth and Religions," in Steven M. Calm and David Shatz, eds., Contemporary, Philosophy, of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 291-300
[19] See his lengthy review of Wilfred Cantwell Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) in Al-Tawhid Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 163Â189, concluded in Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 154-196.
[20] Peter Donovan, "The Intolerance of Religious Pluralsim," Religious Studies, 29 (1993), pp. 217-229.
[21] Ibid., p. 218. Donovan here reports on the views of Moltmann expressed in his contribution to Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, Gavin D'Costa, ed., (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990).
[22] Ibid., p. 219.
[23] John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, (New Haven: Yale, 1989), p. 339.
[24] John Hick "On Grading Religions" in Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 85.
[25] Ibid. pps. 86-87.
[26] John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 336.
[27] The question of religious diversity is taken up by Ibn al-`Arabi, in chapter 48 of the Futuhat, in which he explains that religious diversity is the product of the diversity in the divine relationships. Cf. William C. Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 155-160.
[28] Similar ayat are (48:28) and (61:9).
[29] "The desert Arabs say, `We believe.' Say, `You did not believe, but say, "We submit," for faith has not yet entered your hearts; and if you obey Allah and His Apostle, He will lessen naught of your deeds; verily Allah is oft-forgiving, Merciful." (Al-Quran, 49:14)
[30] John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, 48-49.
[31] Ibid., 50
[32] John Hick; An Interpretation of Religion, p. 378.
[33] John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 233; Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 108; the original may be found in Nicholson's edition of the Mathnavi, Book III, line 1259.
[34] Hick considers religious affiliation analogous to ethnicity in Problems of Religious Pluralism, p. 47.
[35] Discourses of Rumi, tr. Arthur J. Arberry (Richmond: Curzon, 1993), p. 135.
[36] Ibid., p. 136.
[37] Ibid., . 31.
[38] Ibid., 29, p. 134f.
[39] From Saba-ye 'Ishq, translated as, A Jug of Love: Eight Ghazals of Imam Khomeini, tr. Muhammad Legenhausen and Azim Sarvdalir (Tehran: Islamic Thought Foundation, 1994).
[40] See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Islam and the Encounter of Religions" in Sufi Essays 2nd ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 123-151.
[41] See Claude Addas, Quest for the Red Sulpher: The Life of Ibn 'Arabi (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993).
[42] Futuhat, III 311.23, sec Imaginal Worlds, 155.
[43] Futuhat, III, 153.12, translated by William Chittick in Imaginal Worlds, 125.
[44] From the Divan of Baba TAhir, translated by Muhammad Legenhausen and `Azim Sarvdalir.
[45] From Sabu-ye 'Ishq, translated by Muhammad Legenhausen and `Azim Sarvdalir.
[46] From his Siyasat, cited and translated by Fazlur Ralunan in his Prophecy in Islam (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), 40.
[47] Fazlur Raliman, ibid., 40
[48] Ibid., 41. A view similar to Farabi's is endorsed by Ibn Sina in his Risalah al ÂAehawiya
[49] Murtada Mutahhari, 'Adl Ilahi, 10th printing (Qum: Intisharat Sadra, 1357/1978), 287-381. I have also benefitted from discussions with Ayatullah Javadi 'Amuli, Aqa-ye Mustafapur, Aqa-ye Husaynzadeh, Aqa-ye Muhammad Baqir Kharazi, Aqa-ye Qummi, and others, although the position defended here is not to be attributed to any of them, and I bear the responsibility for whatever errors the position contains. May Allah forgive its for our shortcomings, and bless us with knowledge from Him!
[50] See Bihar al-Anwar, Vol. 5, p. 289.
[51] See Fayd Kashani, 'Ilm al-Yaqin, Vol. 2, (Qum: Bidar), p. 1054.
[52] See, for example, (8:74) and (9:20).
[53] Murtada Mutahhari, 'Adl 'Ilahi (Divine Justice), (Qum: Intishairat Sadra, 1357/1978), p. 352 ff.
[54] Also see (5:69).
[55] There is also the issue of whether or not the non-Abrahamic sects are to be considered religions. Some Buddhists, for example, claim that what they teach is merely a philosophy and method of meditation, and that one could be, for example, a Jew and a Buddhist at the same time, just as there are Christian Platonists and Christian Aristotelians.
[56] See Nicholson's edition of the Mathnavi, Book II, line 1720f.
[57] Also see (9:73), (33:73), (48:6) and (66:9).
[58] Murtada Mutahhari, 'Adl Ilahi, p. 293.
[59] Cf. (46:9) and (7:188).
[60] God's threat to the hypocrites may be found at (4:145) and the possibility of mercy for them is stated at (33:24).
[61] See Shaykh Saduq, Al-Itiqadat fi Din al Imamiyah (Qum: Muhaqiq, A. H. 1412), p. 45, translated by Asaf A. A. Fyzee, A Shi'ite Creed (Tehran: WOFIS, 1982), p. 63-64.
[62] See Ayatullah Abu al Hasan Sharani, Sharh-E Tajrid al-I'tiqad (Tehran: Kitabfurushi Islamiyah, 1991), p. 577f..
[63] See Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid (Beirut: Dar el Machreq, 1986), Ch. X.
[64] See Allamah Hilli, Kashf al-Murad (Qum: Mu'assesah al-Nashr al-Islami, n.d.), p. 414-415.
[65] (Al-Quran, 4:48)
[66] See Religious Diversity, ed. Willard G. Oxtoby (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) and Towards a World Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981).
[67] Zayn al-Abidin, Sahifat al-Sajjadiyah, tr. William Chittick (London: Mohammadi Trust, 1989).
[68] See the discussion of this ayah and related ahadith in `Allamah Tabataba'is al Mizan. Also see (Al-Quran, 5:118) and (Al-Quran, 33:24).
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