Divine Justice (Adl) is the foundation of many Shi'i beliefs

By: Ayatullah Jafar Subhani
All Muslims believe that God is just and that justice is one of the divine attributes of Beauty (jamal). The basis of this belief is the Qur'anic negation of any possibility of injustice on the part of God, referring tcr Him as being `upright in justice'. As it is said: Verily, God wrongeth not even the weight of an atom. (Sura al-Nisa', lv: 4o)
And again: Verily, God wrongeth 'not mankind in anything... (Sura Yunus, x: 44)
Also: God bears witness, (as do also) the angels and the men of knowledge, upright in justice, that there is no God save Him. (Sura Al `Imran, lll: 18)
In addition to the evidence provided by these verses, the intel­lect can discern the justice of God with utmost clarity. For justice is an attribute of perfection (kamal), while injustice is an attribute of imperfection; and the hrrmau intellect perceives that God pos­sesses aall ppossible perfections, and that He is exalted beyond any possibility of imperfection or deficiency-, both as regards His Es­sence and His actions.
In principle, injustice and oppression are always consequences of one of the following factors: (a) ignorance-the one who acts unjustly is unaware of the ugliness of injustice; (b) incapacity and need---either the agent of injustice is aware of the ugliness of injustice, but is unable to enactjustice, or else he is in need of the fruits of his injustice; (c) unscrupulorasness through foolishness­—the agent is both aware of the ugliness of injustice, and he is able to enact justice, but since he lacks wisdom, he, has no scruples about committing unjust acts.
It is clear that none of these factors can have anything to do III,, divine nature, all of God's actions being just and wise. The following hadith corroborates this: Shaykh Saduq relates that a Jew came to the Prophet [Muhammad] asking various questions, some of which related to the question of divine justice. In explaining why God does not comrnit inrjustice, the Prophet said: ‘[it is] because God knows the ugliness of in and is not in any need of it.' Theologians of the `adliyya schoolz have seized upon this key hadith in the debate over the question of divine justice.
Given the verses cited above, and many others of similar import Qur'an, all Muslims are at one over the issue of divine justice; but there is a certain difference of opinion regarding the question of what the justice of God actually means. Muslims have opted for one of the two following positions: The human intellect distinguishes between evil and good action, understanding the latter to indicate the perfection of the agent, and the former the imperfection of the agent. Since God, by nature, possesses all ontological perfectior,s, it follows that His acts must be perfect and pleasing, His most. holy na­-ture being devoid of all kind of evil. It is necessary to mention here that the intellect can never, as itwere, issue an `order' as regards God, saying that God 'must' be just; rather, the task of the intellect is to disclose the true reality of God's actions. In other words, taking due account of the absolute perfection of the divine Essence devoid as It is of any possibility of imperfection, the intellect discloses the fact that His actions also partake of ultimate perfection, and are likewise devoid of any deficierrcy. Consequently, God deals justly in His relations with mankind. Verses from the Qur'an are adduced as evidence corroborat­ing and stressing that which man can perceive, and in Islamic theology this approach goes by the name of 'tire intelligibilitv of good and evil' (husn wa qubh aqli); the adherents of this approach are referred to as the adliyya, the forerunrrers of whom were the scholars of the lmami school.
2. There is another perspective, contrasting with this one, according to which the human intellect is incapable of discrirni­nating bbetween good and evil actions, even in a general way. It is asserted that the distinction between good and evil can only be made on the basis of' divine revelation: that it is God who commands us to do good and God who forbids its from doing evil. According to this perspective, if God were to consign sinless souls to Hell and sinners to Paradise, this Would constitute per­fect goodness aml,justice!-If God is described as Just', it is only because He has lrc°en given this attribute by revelation
Since the principle mf `the intelligibility of good and evil' is the foundation of' many Shi'i beliefs, we ought to mcntion, albeit briefly, two of the marry at gttments from which its validity can be derived.
1. Every individual, wltatever be his religious path or creed and wherever he be mr this hlanet, is capable of grasping the beauty of justice and the ugliness of injustice, the beauty of keeping one's word and the ugliness of breaking it, the virtue of repay­ing goodness with goodness and the vice of repaying goodness with evil. History Shows ample evidence of this truth, and hith­erto the wise have rmvcr dcnied it.
2. If we were to suppose that tlre intellect were incapable-in a universal fashion--uf, grasping the distinction between good and evil acts, and that all people must refer to religion to cu­able them to perceive the goodness or evil of a given act, then we would be forced to accept the concomitant argument that even the validity of the religiously suctioned distinction be­tween good and evil could not be proven. For, assuming that the Lawgiver informs its about the goodness of one action arrd the evil of another, we could riot truly benefit from this information for as long as there were any possibilitv in our minds that the Lawgiver rnay not be speaking the truth.•However, the case would be entirely different if it were already self-evident to us that the Lawgiver is utterly beyond the ugliness of lying-­- and this evidence only conies to us by means of the intellect.27
In addition to these two poirrts, there are also verses from the Qur’an which uphold the principle that the intellect is indeed inherently capable of discriminating between good and evil: Shal we then. treat those who have submitted (al-Muslimun) as we treat the guilty? what aileth you? How foolishly ye judge! (Sura al-Qalam, Lxvlll: 35-36)
In this verse, a question is posed, and we are able to provide the answer: Is the reward of goodness other than goodness? (Sura al-Rahman, Lv: 60)
In the following verse, God says: He will not be questioned as to that which He doeth, bud they will be ques­tioned. (Sura al-Anbiya', xxl: 23)
Now the question might arise: God knows that He is too exalted to be accountable to anyone, therefore no action of His can be called to account; but if we operate on the basis of an intellec­tually posited distinction between good and evil, then, supposing that God were to commit [what may appear to us as] an `evil' act, we would have to ask: why has this act been committed? The response to this is as follows: the reason why God is not called to commit is, precisely, because He is Wise, and a wise agent cannot commit any type of unjust action, for wisdom is always inseparable from good action, so there can be no possible action that one might call into qucstion on the part of God.28
There are various ways in which Divine justice is expressed as re­gards the three domains of (a) creation, (b) religious dispensation, and (c) heavenly recompense. We shall explain some of these below, taking each of these domains in turn.

Justice in creation
God bestows upon each existent entity that which is appropriate to it, never depriving it of the receptivity inherent in its nature; this receptivity being determined at the pane of effusion of Be­ing, and in the invisible dimension in which the act of bestowing existence occurs. As the Qur'an says: OurLord is He Who gave unto everything its nature, then guided it aright. (Sura Ta Ha, xx:5o)

Justice in religious dispensation
God guides man--endowed as he is with the capacity to acquire spiritual perfection-by sending Messengers to establish religious laws. He does not impose alrov mall obligations that go beyond his capacity. As the Qur'an says: Verily God enjoineth justice and kinedss and generosity to kinsfolk, and forbiddeth lewdness and abomination and wickedness. He exhorteth you in order that ye may take heed. (SUra al-Nahl, xvl: 90)
Since justice, kindness and generosity contribute to human perfection, while the other three elements mentioned contribut to man's downfall, the first three qualities have been made ob­ligatory, and the second three are prohibited. Likewise, as regards man not being charged with religious obligations that are beyond his capacity, the Qur'an says: And We task not any soul beyond its scope ... (Sura al-Mu'minun, XXIIl: 62)

Justice in recompense
When it comes to apportioning reward and punishment, God never treats the believer in the same way as the disbeliever, the good in the same way as the bad; rather, He gives each person an appropriate, fitting recompense: Accordingly. God will never pun­ish people whose religious obligations have not been revealed by mean of divinely-guided Messengers, and who have not, con­sequently, received the full force of the divine proof.29 As the Qur’an says: We never punish until We have sent a Messenger. (Sura Bani Isra'il, xvll: 15)
And also: And we set a just balance for the Day of Resurrection so that no soul is wronged in aught. (Sura al-Anbiya', xxl:47)
God created man, and this creation has a purpose. This purpose is that man attain the plenitude of all that the human soul can aspire to, doing so by means of the graces realized through devotion to God. Whenever man is guided to the point where he becomes aware of this purpose, and pledges himself to undertake the first step leading to its realization, God Himself sees to it that they are indeed accomplished. Without this divine help, the creation of man would be lacking any means of realizing the perpose of creation. It is for this reason that Messengers were sent to mankind, providing them with both explanations and miraculous acts. Thus, God proclaims messages containing prom­ises and threats, with a view to inspiring His slaves with earnest desire (targhib) for obedience, and with fearful anxiety (tahdhir) to avoid disobedience.
What has been expressed above is a summary of the principle of loving-kindness (lutf) in the `adlivyat.heology,which infact con­stitutes one of the branches of the principle of discernment between good and evil, the foundation of many theological

Divine Decree (Qada') and Measure (Qadar)
Belief in the principles of Qada and Qadar is of extreme Impor­tance iin Islam, figuring prominently in the divine Scripture mid in the hadiths of the Prophet; it is a belief that is strengthened also by intellectual ar,tiurnents. _f here are many verses in the Qur'an concerning these two principles; we quote a few of these below. First, in relation to mwusru-e (Qadar): Verily, We have created everything by measure.(Sirra al-Qamar, Llv: 49)
And there is riot a thing but with Us are the treasuries therefor, and we send it not down save in appointed measure.(SUra al-Hijr, xv: 21)
As regards the divine decree (qada): When, He decreeth a thing, He said unto it only: Be!, And it is. (Sura al­Baqara, ll: 117)
He is Who hath created you from clay, and hath decreed a termz for you. (Sura al-An'am, V1:2)
Taking these verses, along with a larger number of' hadiths of similar import, no Muslim Can deny the reality of divine predesti­nation. However, an analytical knowledge of all the minute details of this complex question is not necessary; and, in principle, for those who lack the conceptual dexterity to assimilate this type of subtle reality, it would be better lo avoid entering into discussions and deliberations upon it. For all trm many are liable to open themselves up to erroneous doctrines mr be thrown into dotrbt and lose their way. It is in regard to just such a type, one feels, that Imam `Ali said: `This [doctrine of predestination] is a dark path--­do not traverse it; a deep ocean--do not enter it; and a divine mystery-do not try and unveil it.30
Needless to say, the Imam's will oiy here is directed to those who cannot comprehend such complex and subtle doctriues, con­sidering the large number of people that would have become coofrrsed if they were to enter into debate on such questions. But elsewhere, the lmam has been quite forthcoming with regard to intellectrral explanations of the ductrirre.;' Therefore we shall endeavour, within the limits imposed by our own knowledge, to explain this doctrine by highlighting certain Qur'anic verses and hadiths, and offering brief comments on them.
The term qadar in the Arabic language means `measure' and `portion' and qada pertains to that which is definite and decided.32 The eighth Imam, Imam Rida, said by way of' commentary upon these two terms: `Qadar is to be understood as the measuring out of a thing in relation to its subsistence (baqa) and its extinction (fana); and qada' is the bestowal upon a given entity of its definitive capacity to actualize itself."33

Commentary on Qadar
Each creature, insofar as it is a contingent being (mumkin al-wujud) has a particurlar existential limit and extent. All things other than God exist in a particular way, are limited in differing degrees, take on different modes of existence: minerals have a particrrlar existential measrrre or 'cut', differing frorn that of 'plants and aninals. just as the very existence that is apportioned to all things is itself a creature of God, likewise, the initial measuring out (taqdir) of all things comes from Him. Therefore, this measuring out of existence can be understood as an act of God: it is referred to as ‘active determination and apportioning in act'. This, in turn, is to be understood in the light of the following: Before creating a thing, God already knows it in its unrnanifest state of latency or potenti­ality; this being referred to as determination and apportioning in knowledge'.
Belief in qadar is tantamount to belief in the creatorship of God as regards the particular properties of all things, and His ‘active determination' of things rests upon His pre-eternal knowledge; in consequence, belief in the divine knowledge of qadar is but a function of belief in the eternal knowledge of God.

Commentary on Qada'
As mentioned above, qada' is to be understood as thc Icsmwal of definitive existence upon an entity. Naturally, the process by which this definitive existence is attained rests upon the operation of the law of cause and effect. A thing receives its cxi.smvrwc its a re­sult oof the complete actualization of the causo of its oxistence. Insofar as this law of causality derives ultimamlv In-mv God, the reality of the definitive nature of each existing mnitv rusts upon the power and will of God. There is an `active' qada' wlrich oper­ates at the level of creation, and an `essential' qyln' w Iv iol v pertains to God's eternal knowledge of all things such as they are before they come into being.
What has been said so far has been in relatimv to creative qada' and qadar-whether in essential or active mode. But both princi­ples also apply to the realm of religious dispensation, in that the principle of religious obligation is also determined by divine qada'; and the particular properties of these obligationvs --as wgards what is necessary, forbidden, and so on-also drive from `religious pre-determination' (taqdir tashri’i). In reply to someone question­ing the reality of qada' arid qadar, Imam `Ali referred to this ontological level and said: `The meaning ml qndn' arrcl qadar per­tains to commanding obedience arid forbiddmg disobedience; the bestowing of power upon man to perform good works and renounce evil works; the provision of grace to increase nearness to God; delivering up the sinners to their own [inner] states; the making of promises and threats-all these relate to the qada' and qadar of God in regard to our actions. 34
We can see from this r \eply that the Imam restricted himself to speaking about qada' and qadar in relation to religious dispensa­tion, possibly on account of his awareness of the need for the questioner-and those present at the the particular attitude and state of soul that the questioner lacked. For, at that time, the issue of existential prrclwstirratica, and its implications as regards human action, was leading towards an ab­solute pre-determinism (jabr), and therewith thcv negation of free will (ikhtiyar). Evidence for onr interpretation is given by the fact that the hadith continues as follows: 'Do not speculate on anything other than this, for such speculation will nullify your actions.' The meaning here is that the value of man's actions is predicated upon his free will; and a belief in the absolute pre-determinism of ac­ction annuls this freedom, and hence the value of human action.
To conclude: qadd' and qadar are applicable both to creation and to religious dispensation, and each of these two realms comprises two modes: an 'essential' mode, related to divine knowledge; and an 'active' mode, related to manifestation.
Divine predestination is not in the least incompatible with humam free will. For what God has ordained for man is, precisely, free will, the very feature which distinguishes him from the ani­mals; man has been ordained a free agent, capable of choosing to perform or to abstain from his actions. The divine decree in re­gard to human action is that, once the will and desire to perform a given action are established, the action will follow decisively. In other words, the very creation of man inherently comprises free­dom as regards human will, along with its capacity to evaluate and judge; in this respect, the divine decree is that whenever man decides upon an action, and possesses the necessary means to perform it, a divine power brings into effect the accomplishment of the action in question.
There are those who believe that their sinfulness is the prod­uct of divine predestination, and that it was never in fact possible for them to have chosen any path other than the one which they in fact followed; but both intellect and revelation alike repudiate such as opinion. From the intellectual point of view, man deter­mins his destiny by means of his own decisions; from the religious point of view also, man is deemed to have the capacity to be either pious and grateful or impious and wicked, as the Qur'an says: Verily, we have shown him the way, whether he be grateful or disbelieving. (sura al-Insan, Lxxvl: 3)
At the time of the Revelation, one party of idolators attributed their idol-worship to the will of God, arguing that were it not His will, they would not have worshipped idols. The Qur'an relates their fanciful notion thus: Those who are idolators will say: Had God only willed, we would not have ascribed [unto Him] partners, neither would our fathers, nor would we have forbidden anything,.
The response then follows: Thus did those who were before them give the lie, till they tasted of the fear of Us. (Sura al-An`am, vl: 148)
To conclude this discussion, let its remind ourselves that the universal pathways established by God in the created universe­some terminating in the altimate felicity of man, others in his utter ruin-theso pathways are but manifestations of divine pre­destination; and man, alone, has the freedom to choose either one of 'these paths.

Man and Free Will
Human free will is a self-evidew realitv which can be assimilated by man in various ways, some of-which we shall discuss here.
1. The conscience of each person bears testimony to his ability to decide either to perform or to abstain from a given action; if this self-evident fact be denied, then no axiornatic truth what­soever can ever be accepted.
2. Throughout human society--religiously governed or other­wise--one finds that widely differing persons are subject to praise or blame; this should be taken as a sign that the attribu­tion of free will to the individual is a universally encountered fact.
3. If the free will of the individual were non-existent, the dictates of religion would be vain and futile. For if each individual were helpless in regard to his life, he would be compelled to con­tinue to follow the course of life that had been established for him previously, and thus unable to deviate by even an inch from that path; in such a case' tile religious commands and prohibitions, promises and threats, rewards and punishments, would all be utterly meaningless.
4. Throughout the course of lwrnan history, one obsorves that the reform of the individrtal and of socierv has been an overriding concen, to which end many programmes and policies have been promulgated, yielding clear results.It is evident that such efforts are entirely incompatible with belief in determinism as regards human action, for if the individual were assumed to be devoid of free will, all such efforts Would be, a waste of time.
These four points decisively and irrefutable establish thc reality of free will. However, the principle of free will does not allow us to conclude that rrran possesses absolute liberty, and that God exercise no influence over his actions. For such a belief: called tafwid; contradicts the principle of man's eternal dependence upon God; it also restricts sphere of power and creativity proper to God. This is an erroneous opinion, as will be made clearer in the following Article.
After the passing away of tlu: Holy Prophet, one of the questiorrs that engaged Muslim thinkers was that of the nature of human action. One group adopted the viewpoint of determinism (jabr), regarding man as an intrinsically constrained agent; another group took the diametrically opposite position, conceiving of 'man as an entity delivered up entirely to his own resources, his actions having no connection at all with God. Both groups upheld an exclusivist point of view: action either devolved entirely upon man or entirely upon God, it was either human power that was effective or ­divine power.
There is, however, a third perspective, the one upheld by the Holy Imams of the ahl al-bayt. Imam Sadiq stated: `Neither compulsion (jabr) nor complete freedom (tafwid): rather, something between the two. 35
In other words, although action devolves upon man, it is also dependent upon God; for the action proceeds from the human agent, but since in reality the agent, along with his power, is cre­ated by God, how can one consider the action of such an agent to be independent of God?
The way in which the ahl al-bayt clarify the reality of human action is nothing other than the way oft he Qur'an. This revealed Scripture occasionally refers action both to its immediate agent and to God, rendering one and the same action susceptible of dual attribution. As the following verse says:
... And thou threwest not when thou didst throw [a handful of dust], but God threw. (Sura al-Anfal, vlll: 17)
The meaning here is that whenever the Holy Prophet under­took an action, he did not do so on the sole basis of his independent agency or power; rather, the action was accomplished through the power of God. Thus, the attribution of the action to two sources is sound and correct. Put differently, the power and might of God are present within every phenomenon; this touches upon a mystery which we might try and conrprehend by means of the following simile: A current of electricity, generated by a power­station, is present in electric wires; however, it is we who switch the lights on and off. It is correct to say that we switch on the light, just as it is also correct to say that the light of the bulb is derived from the electric current.
An integral aspect of our belief in man's free will is our certainty of God's foreknowledge of all our actions from pre-eternity. There is no contradiction between these two beliefs. Whoever cannot in fact reconcile them should consider carefully that the eternal knowledge of God encompasses the principle by which actions proceed from the free will of man; naturally, there is no contra­diction between such fore-knowledge, on the one hand, and human freedom, on the other.