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The Divine Will and Decree
One of the Attributes of Perfection of God is that of will (irādah) and decree (mashiyyah), as Al-murīd (the Desirous or Willing) is considered one of the Divine Names. In the Holy Qur’an, the words mashiyyah, irādah and al-murīd have not been used for God, but in many verses the phrases shā’ Allāh, yashā’ Allāh, arād Allāh, aradnā, yurīd Allāh, and nurīd have been used. Some Views on the Essence of Will #7717;ādith). Its state is either contingent in essence as claimed by the Karrāmiyyah group,9 or contingent neither in essence nor other than essence #7717;ādith lā fī maḥall) as described by Abū ‘Alī and Abū Hāshim.10 6. Irādah is one of the Attributes of the Divine Essence, but it has negative sense; that is, the agency (fā‘iliyyah) of God is not based on compulsion or forgetfulness (conscious and volitional). This view has been adopted by Ḥusayn al-Najjār, a Mu‘tazilī theologian.11 7. The essence of irādah is exaltation (ibtihāj) and contentment (riḍā’), and it is divided into two, viz. essential (dhātī) and active (fi‘lī) irādah: The essential exaltation and contentment is the essential will while the active exaltation and contentment is the active will (irādah-ye fi‘lī). Since God is Pure #7779;irf) and Absolute (maḥḍ) Being, He is essentially elated (mubtahij bi ’dh-dhāt), and His Essence is being Self-contented (essential contentment (riḍā’ bi ’dh-dhāt equals essential will (irādah-ye dhātī)). Meanwhile, essential exaltation and contentment necessitates exaltation and contentment in the stage of action, for “Whoever loves something loves its effects” (that is, exaltation and contentment in the stage of action equals active will (irādah-ye fi‘lī)). Muḥaqqiq al-Iṣfahānī, better known as Kampānī,12 has subscribed to this view.13 Assessment of the Views #7717;ādith). It is evident that pre-existence (azaliyyah) and contingency #7717;udūth) cannot go hand in hand. The sixth view is also unacceptable because irādah is one of the Positive Attributes (al-ṣifat al-thubūtiyyah) and not one of the Negative Attributes (al-ṣifāt al-salbiyyah). Therefore, it must be not identified as a Negative Attribute. The point of strength of the seventh view is in interpreting irādah in the realms of Essence and Action. Yet, the problem with this view is in treating the concepts of exaltation (ibtihāj) and contentment (riḍā’) as identical with those of will (irādah) and decree (mashiyyah), and interchanging the two concepts is similar to interchanging knowledge and power, which is inadmissible. In addition, traditions stipulate that irādah is contingent and one of the Attributes of Action, and not an Attribute of Essence. An Examination and Analysis #7789;abī‘ī) traits from it. The concept which remains after the purging is one of the Attributes of existential perfection [of the Absolute Being]. However, if the essence of the said attribute also ceases to exist after purging those traits, it follows that the said attribute is one of the perfections of a particular being and not the Self-existent. For example, knowledge in the human being has some characteristics and after purging knowledge of those characteristics, nothing remains except discovery (inkishāf) and presence #7717;uḍūr). That is, the reality of the known (ma‘lūm) before itself is discovery and presence, and this is the truth of knowledge. We can establish this truth for God. Now, if we apply this method to irādah, we will find out that no other attribute will remain except free-will (ikhtiyār). The essence of irādah in the human being is a mental (nafsānī) state which is derived from knowledge and desire (shawq). This mental state is only necessary in relation to the actions of the limbs (af‘āl-e jawāriḥī), and not necessary with respect to inward actions (af‘āl-e jawāniḥī) which include irādah. That is, irādah is one of the voluntary actions of the self (nafs) but it is not precedented by itself. Meanwhile, once an action is materialized, irādah ceases to exist whereas the attribute of free-will remains the same prior to, during, and after, an action. From the above analysis, it can be inferred that what is one of the Attributes of Perfection for the Self-existent is the attribute of ikhtiyār and not irādah, and that which is an Essential Attribute is ikhtiyār and not irādah. It is true that irādah can be abstracted from the stage of action, just as the attributes of rizq (sustenance) and al-rāziq (the Sustainer) are abstracted from the stage of action. The totality of the causes and preliminaries of the action are attributed to God (relative to the agent or mover) as well as to action (cause and effect relationship). In the context of the first relationship, God is called Al-murīd (the Willing and Desirous One) and the Divine Will is abstracted, while in the context of the second relationship, the action is God’s object of will (murād).14 It is worth mentioning that the present discourse pertains to the derivation of the essence of irādah from knowledge or power, and not the unity of its manifestations as the Divine Unity in the Attributes demands. For example, the concept or essence of power is not identical with the concept or essence of power, although they are the same for being among the manifestations of the Divine Essence. The Divine Will as Described in Traditions #7717;ādith). Interpreting it to mean eternal knowledge is equally negated [in the traditions]. Now, we shall quote below some examples of pertinent traditions: 1. Muḥammad ibn Muslim reported that Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a) said: “The will [of God] is contingent.”15 2. In a tradition transmitted by Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā from Imām al-Kāẓim (‘a), after stating the characteristics of irādah in the human being and that these characteristics are impossible with regards to God, the Imām (‘a) has said: “The will of Allah is the action itself and nothing else. He say, ‘Be’ and it is.”16 3. ‘Āṣim ibn Ḥamīd asked Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a), thus: “Has God been the Desirous (al-murīd) from eternity?” The Imām (‘a) replied: “Indeed there cannot be the Desirous (al-murīd) without the object of desire (murād). Instead, He has been all-knowing and all-powerful from eternity and then He willed.”17 4. Bakīr ibn A‘yan asked Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a), “Are the knowledge and will of Allah identical or distinct from each other?” The Imām (‘a) replied: “[His] knowledge is different from [His] will on account of which we say, ‘I will do something if Allah wills,’ and we do not say, ‘I will do something if Allah knows.’ Thus, that we say, “If Allah wills” shows that He has not desired prior to this. Whenever He desires something to materialize, it will materialize the way He wants it, and the knowledge of Allah precedes His will.”18 5. Imām al-Riḍā (‘a) is reported to have said: “The decree and will [of God] is among the Attributes of Actions.”19 6. In his debate with ‘Imrān the Sabian, Imām al-Riḍā (‘a) has said: “And know that origination, decree and will have the same meaning and they have three names.”20 7. In a long debate between Imām al-Riḍā (‘a) and Sulaymān Marwazī, the renowned Mu‘tazilī theologian of Khurāsān, that took place in the court of [the ‘Abbāsid caliph] Ma‘mūn, one of the issues they disputed on was whether the will of God is one of the Attributes of Essence or the Attributes of Action and whether will is identical with knowledge or a distinct attribute. Sulaymān has considered will one of the Essential Attributes and interpreted it as knowledge (as the Mu‘tazilah do subscribe) while Imām al-Riḍā (‘a) has regarded it as contingent and an Attribute of Action.21 Review Questions |